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INTRODUCTION
Aristotle maintained that "[p]leasures impede wise think-
ing,... for while [they] last no one can think of anything."'
Although the absolute nature of Aristotle's statement is question-
able, the premise behind it may help to explain the continued, rapid
spread of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the causative
agent of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), in an era
of informed decision-making.2 It is common knowledge that AIDS
is a deadly, incurable disease transferred through sexual contact, yet
individuals continue to engage in sexual activity with persons of
unknown HIV status;' it is common knowledge that the spread of
HIV can be greatly reduced through the use of condoms, 4 yet
t B.S. 1990, State University of New York at Binghamton; M.S. 1992, Syracuse
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A. Siegel, Pragati K. Balsawer, Suann C. Maclsaac, Daniel D. Dex, my family, and the
members the Law Review for their assistance and support.
I ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1152b, lns. 16-18 (Hippocrates G.
Apostle trans., 1975); see also ROLLO MAY, LOVE AND WILL 38 (1969) (stating that sex
"remains the power of procreation, the drive which perpetuates the race, the source
at once of the human being's most intense pleasure and his most pervasive anxiety[;]
[i]t can, in its daimonic form, hurl the individual into sloughs of despond, and, when
allied with eros, it can lift him out of his despondency into orbits of ecstasy").
2 In 1993, AIDS became the leading cause of death for persons aged 25 to 44
years old. See Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 1994, 44
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 64,67 (1995) [hereinafter AIDS Update]; see also
Update: Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS Among Persons Aged 25-44 Years-
United States, 1990 and 1991,42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 481,483 (1993)
[hereinafter Mortality Update] (providing figures indicating that from 1982 to 1991
deaths caused by"HIV infection" increased in an approximately exponential fashion).
- Cf Helena Brett-Smith & Gerald H. Friedland, Transmission and Treatment, in
AIDS LAw TODAY 18, 20 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993) (stating that "in the United
States large numbers of currently uninfected people remain at risk because of their
ongoing patterns of behavior").
' The term "condom" as used in this Comment is intended to mean "latex
condom." See TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND
PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 23-24 (1993)
(noting that the latex condom reduces the risk of HIV transmission). Some condoms
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individuals partake in unprotected sexual activity. AIDS is the most
feared and dreaded disease in our society,5 yet individuals will not
sacrifice pleasure to escape its wrath.6
Because educating individuals on the effects of AIDS has not
proved sufficient to deter completely the spread of the disease,
society must attempt to devise additional means of curtailing the
pandemic. The legal system can help meet this challenge by
creating deterrents to the spread of HIV. Effective legal deterrents
are valuable not only to protect potential victims, but also to lessen
the profound impact of the AIDS epidemic "on the legal, social,
economic, and ethical institutions and structures of our society."
7
To deter the spread of HIV, the legal system must discourage
activities that contribute to disease transmission. Most importantly,
the law must dissuade individuals from engaging in "'unprotected
anal sex; unprotected vaginal sex; unprotected oral/genital and
oral/anal sex; unprotected sex with many partners; [and from]
having sex while drunk or high.'"' This Comment will examine
how the law can most effectively allocate the burdens associated
with the negligent sexual transmission of HIV. Drawing upon
fundamental concepts of tort and contract law, this Comment seeks
to balance the negligence cause of action and the assumption of risk
defense in a manner that achieves an optimal degree of deterrence
to HIV-transmitting sexual conduct.
To maximize tort law's deterrent effect, this Comment proposes
a new formulation of the assumption of risk defense that correlates
legal burdens with parties' relative degrees of knowledge of
are made of lamb intestine, but it is unclear whether such condoms are effective
against the spread of HIV. See id. at 23 n.27 ; see also PETER GOULD, THE SLOW
PLAGUE: A GEOGRAPHY OF THE AIDS PANDEMIC 48 (1993) (noting that some
condoms are made of animal skins "even though the animal membranes are not
barriers to the passage of HIV").
' See Prevention and Control of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: An Interim
Report, 258JAMA 2097, 2097(1987) (referring to a Gallup poll indicating that AIDS
is the highest health priority for many individuals); Fear of AIDS Rivals Wory Over
Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1987, at C3 (stating that a Media General-Associated
Press poll reported that 48% of individuals who feared one disease over all others
feared AIDS the most).
6 Cf AIDS Update, supra note 2, at 64-65 (noting that over 43,000 of the 80,691
AIDS cases reported in 1994 involved individuals whose only exposure to the virus
was through sexual contact).
7 AIDS COORDINATING COMM., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, AIDS: THE LEGAL ISSUES
13 (Discussion Draft 1988) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
s Doe v.Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1390-91 (W.D. Mich) (citation omitted), cause
dismissed sub nom. Moore v.Johnson, 826 F. Supp. 1106 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
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potential HIV-transmission risks. This comparative knowledge
approach to apportioning legal responsibilities deters both infected
and uninfected individuals' from risky conduct by placing the cost
of the HIV transmission on the party better situated to know of the
risk involved in the sexual encounter. The approach serves the
deterrent goals of tort law more effectively than the current
assumption of risk defense, retains a firm grounding in common-law
policies and principles, and resolves many of the tensions and
inconsistencies that pervade current tort law. The benefits of the
proposal suggest the utility of the comparative knowledge formula-
tion not only for curbing the spread of HIV, but also for apportion-
ing risks in numerous other contexts where the assumption of risk
doctrine has proven inadequate.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief description of the
pathology of AIDS. Part II demonstrates the ability of the tort law
to deter the spread of HIV and examines how present principles of
the negligence cause of action and the assumption of risk defense
apply to the tort of negligent sexual transmission of HIV. Part III
presents the deficiencies of current assumption of risk doctrine.
Finally, Part IV proposes a comparative knowledge analysis as a
reformulation of present assumption of risk doctrine.
I. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISEASE
AIDS, an incurable disease first identified in 1983,1° is the last
phase of infection by HIV.'1 HIV, also referred to as Human T-
' Cf John H. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV. 17, 53
(1961) (stating that "[w]hen the plaintiff is denied recovery ... it must be that our
desire to deter the defendant and our willingness to make him compensate for any
injuries that have occurred are outweighed by a desire to deter the plaintiff and
educate [her] to a responsible exercise of [her] power of choice").
10 See TASK FORCE ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, PENNSYLVANIA
BAR ASS'N, AIDS: LAW AND SOCIETY 5 (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; see
asoJune E. Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: Discovery of a New Disease, in AIDS AND THE
LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 17, 19 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987) (noting
that "the first sufferers of what we now call AIDS were described in the summer of
1981"); cf. GOULD, supra note 4, at 109,201 (noting that HIV-1 was first identified in
1982).
Although it took until 1983 to isolate the virus, there is evidence that the virus
first appeared in Africa in the 1950s, and in the United States in 1978. See id. at 12
(noting that blood samples which were extracted from a Danish surgeon in Zaire in
1959 were later found to contain HIV); Osborn, supra, at 23 (stating that
"[r]etrospective testing of stored serum samples.has confirmed that the virus first
appeared in the United States in 1978").
1 See U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERv., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED
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Lymphotropic Virus type III (HTLV III) and Lymphadenopathy-
Associated Virus (LAV),'2 is transmitted through the passage of
bodily fluid. The virus "has been found in blood, semen, vaginal
fluids, breast milk, saliva, tears, urine, and cerebrospinal fluid.
However, documented transmission has occurred only with blood,
semen, vaginal fluids and breast milk.""3 Although the sharing of
hypodermic needles among drug users is a-significant contributor
to the spread of the virus, the most common means of transferring
the disease is through sexual contact. 4
Once a victim is infected with HIV she'5 may experience flu-
like symptoms. 6 Soon thereafter, she will become asymptomatic
and will not experience any symptoms that might lead her to believe
she is infected with HIV.'7 The infected individual will remain
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 9 (1986) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]
(stating that a person with AIDS is in "a final stage of a series of health problems"
caused by HIV).
12 See id.
13 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.
'" See Richard Green, The Transmission of AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE
FOR THE PUBLIC, supra note 10, at 28,31 (stating that "[s]exual interaction is the most
common way to transmit HIV"); AIDS Update, supra note 2, at 65 (noting that over
50% of the AIDS cases reported in 1993 and 1994 involved individuals whose only
risk of exposure to HIV was through sexual contact); see also State v. Gamberella, 633
So. 2d 595, 599 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "[flor adults, the two most common
forms of transmission of the [HIV] virus are sexual activity and sharing needles (in
IV. drug use)").
" Throughout this Comment the HIV transmitter, or defendant, will be referred
to with the male pronoun. The person contracting HIV, or the plaintiff, will be
addressed with the female pronoun. The distinction is intended to make the
discussion clearer. The female pronoun was chosen for the plaintiffbecause females
engaging in heterosexual sex are at greater risk for contracting HIV than similarly
situated males. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 3, at 20 (stating that women
account for "61 percent of all cases [ofHIV transmission] attributed to heterosexual
contact" and noting that AIDS is having a "rising impact on women in the United
States"); id. at 25 (recognizing studies showing that the recipient partners in sex,
which are the women in heterosexual sex, have the highest risk of HIV infection
through sexual conduct).
The heterosexual context adopted for the sake of clarity is not intended to de-
emphasize the impact that AIDS has had, and continues to have, on the homosexual
community. Male homosexual and bisexual contact continues to be the predominant
mode of HIV transmission. See AIDS Update, supra note 2, at 65 (noting that 43.3%
of the AIDS cases reported in 1994 and 47.3% of the cases reported in 1993 involved
individuals whose only risk of HIV exposure was "male homosexual/bisexual
contact"). There have also been some reported cases linked to sexual activity between
lesbians. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 3, at 25 (recognizing that "several
published cases have been attributed to lesbian sex").
16 "[T]his period of high viral activity seems to very short-lived, in the range often
to twenty days." Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 3, at 31.
'" See id. at 33 ("Following seroconversion [(the short period of high viral activity)]
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asymptomatic for an average of ten years." After such time, she
will develop AIDS. 9
It is now sufficiently clear that all HIV-infected individuals will
develop AIDS;2 1 when they do, they are expected to die within two
years.2 ' They do not, however, die from HIV itself. The effect of
the virus is to impair the body's immune system by attacking white
blood cells. When an HIV-infected person's CD4 count2 2 falls
below 200, she is considered to have AIDS." At this point, her
body will generally be unable to defend against disease. Opportu-
nistic infections-infections that are "capable of causing disease only
in a host whose resistance is lowered"24-will invade the body and
most infected people completely recover their sense of health and well-being and
become virtually asymptomatic.").
" See GOULD, supra note 4, at 3 (stating that "[t]he average time between initial
infection and the collapse of the immune system is about ten years: death ...
invariably follows within three or four years"); PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4, at
18 (stating that "the median time for conversion from the (relatively) inactive or
incubation stage to full-blown AIDS is about ten years from the time the patient is
infected with the AIDS virus"); see also Don Colburn, Long-Term AIDS Survivors Puzzle
Scientists, WASH. POST,Jan. 31, 1995, § G (Magazine), at 7 (noting that "perhaps one
in eight [persons infected] will remain AIDS-free up to 20 years after infection").
19 When an individual shifts from the asymptomatic period to full-blown AIDS, she
may experience nonlethal ailments. This intermediate stage was formerly labeled
ARC or "AIDS-Related Complex." PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4, at 17; see also
Tischler v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (noting that ARC is the
"viral precursor to AIDS").
21 Compare Bonnie E. Elber, Note, Negligence as a Cause of Action for Sexual
Transmission of AIDS, 19 U. TOL. L. REv. 923, 925 (1988) (noting that some
individuals will test positive for HIV but will not "exhibit any symptoms and never
progress to fully evolved AIDS") with ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 11-12 ("Although
earlier studies concluded that the disease did not necessarily and invariably result
from HIV infection, a recent study of gay men suggests that all who become infected
with the virus are likely to develop the disease in time.").
21 See PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4, at 17 (noting that the "average interval
from [AIDS] diagnosis to death is today 22 months"); Green, supra note 14, at 30
(stating that "AIDS is fatal, on average, two years after diagnosis").
' HIV "enters a type of white blood cell known as the T-helper lymphocyte, which
contains a specific antigen (disease-fighting agent) called CD4 (so the T-helper
lymphocyte is also called the CD4 cell)." PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4, at 16-
17.
"s See id. at 18 (stating that the CDC "decided that anyone with a CD4 cell count
below 200... shall be deemed to have AIDS, even though some of these people are
asymptomatic and many are at least free from serious disease"); see also AIDS Update,
supra note 2, at 66 (noting that the CDC expanded its AIDS surveillance criteria in
1993, including "CD4 reporting criteria in the surveillance definition").
24 STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1095 (25th ed. 1990); see also ABA REPORT,
supra note 7, at 12 ("The most widely known of these opportunistic infections is a
previously rare type of lung infection, Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia. The
dysfunction of the immune system also causes someunusual malignancies, Kaposi's
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induce death.
Once HIV has entered the body, there is no means of prevent-
ing the onset of AIDS; 25 nor is there any immunization to prevent
the initial spread of the virus.26 The virus, however, is detectable.
When a person is infected with HIV, her body starts to produce
antibodies to fight the virus. These antibodies can be detected
within one to six months of a person's exposure to HIV.2' Al-
though the antibodies are not useful to fend off the virus, 28 they
are nonetheless valuable because their detection allows individuals
to learn of their HIV status. Once an individual is informed of her
positive HIV status, she can help reduce the spread of HIV by
avoiding high-risk activities.
2 9
sarcoma and lymphomas being the cancers most commonly described in individuals
with AIDS.").
" The onset of AIDS may, however, be postponed by ingestion of Aziothymidine
(AZT), see Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 3, at 38-40 (describing AZT's effect on
HIV), and/or 3TC, see Marlene Cimons, Combined AIDS Drug Therapy Shows Promise,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at A16 (noting that "3TC, taken in combination with the
commonly used drug AZT, decrease[s] AIDS infection and appear[s] to improve the
immune systems of patients better than either drug used alone").
26 See Larry Gostin, Traditional Public Health Strategies, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A
GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC, supra note 10, at 47, 47 (stating that the virus underlying
AIDS "cannot currently be prevented [by medicine] or treated").27 See PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4, at 19 ("The median time between
infection and the production of detectable amounts of HIV antibodies has been
estimated at 2.1 months, with 95 percent of infected persons producing detectable
amounts of antibodies within 5.8 months .... " (citation omitted)); Brett-Smith &
Friedland, supra note 3, at 32 ("Blood tests usually become positive ... within four
to six weeks [of exposure], and it is estimated that at least 95 percent of those who
eventually develop true infection test positive within the first six months."). Once a
person tests positive for HIV, she is considered "seropositive." Seropositive is
technically defined as "[the status of a person's blood when test results reveal HIV
antibodies-as determined by two positive ELISA's and a positive Western Blot."
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at A-3 (The ELISA and Western Blot are two
types of tests for the HIV antibody.).
" Unlike antibodies that combat many other communicable diseases, however,
"the antibody against HIV is ineffective against the virus." Deane K. Corliss,
Comment, AIDS-LiabilityforNegligent Sexual Transmission, 18 CUMB. L. REv. 691, 696
(1988) (citation omitted).
" SeeJane H. Aiken, Education as Prevention, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR
THE PUBLIC, supra note 10, at 90, 90 (stating that "[b]ecause AIDS cannot be
contained by medical means such as a vaccine, people must be taught how to contain
the spread of the virus through their own activity"). HIV is not very robust, and thus
is unlikely to be transferred except through high-risk activity. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text (describing high-risk activities). The virus can only survive in
living cells; "[i]ts potency decreases greatly on drying, and it can be readily and
completely inactivated by a number of commonly-used disinfectants including soaps,
detergents, alcohol, and a 1:10 dilution of household bleach." TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 7.
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II. TORT LAW'S DETERRENT EFFECT
A. Principles of Deterrence in Tort Law
1. Traditional Principles of Deterrence
As leading tort scholars have noted,
The "prophylactic" factor of preventing future harm has been
quite important in the field of torts.... When the decisions of the
courts become known, and defendants realize that they may be
held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to prevent the
occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one reason for
imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing that
incentive.
3 0
In essence, "[t]ort law is the mechanism this society uses to
discourage individuals from subjecting others to unreasonable
risks"3 -risks that effect socially undesirable results. An under-
lying premise of the tort system is that individuals will become
informed of the legal ramifications of their actions and will modify
their behavior accordingly.3 2 Although some commentators have
attempted to refute this assumption,"3 there are theories of human
behavior that support assertions of tort law's deterrent effect.
3 4
" W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at
25-26 (5th ed. 1984).
"' Donald H.J. Hermann, Torts: Private Lawsuits About AIDS, in AIDS AND THE
LAw: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC, supra note 10, at 153, 153. Another premise
underlying our tort system is the notion that if"rules of liability [are] followed [they]
will bring about, at least approximately, the efficient-the cost-justified-level of
accidents and safety." Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 29,
33 (1972). In the context of AIDS, the cost to society is the propagation of HIV,
which is causing a strain on the social and economic structures of our society. See
ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
12 See Grant H. Morris, Requiring SoundJudgments of Unsound Minds: Tort Liability
and the Limits of TherapeuticJurisprudence, 47 SMU L. REV. 1837, 1850 (1994) (stating
that "tort law assumes that people are aware of potential tort sanctions and alter their
behavior to avoid them"); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law,
42 KAN. L. REv. 115, 116 (1993) (noting that "[a] credible theory of human behavior
that supports the deterrence theory is a modest prerequisite to the decision to use
tort law to influence human behavior").
33 See Shuman, supra note 32, at 167 ("[N]one of the mainstream theories of
human behavior support the likelihood that tort sanctions appropriately deter unsafe
behavior.").
' Cf. Daniel W. Shuman, Making the World a Better Place Through Tort Law?:
Through the Therapeutic Looking Glass, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 739, 753 (1993)
(stating that "[a]lthough the architects of tort law have never explicitly addressed what
theory of human behavior underlies their assumption that tort sanctions are likely to
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In the context of AIDS, society is concerned with preventing
sexual episodes in which HIV is transferred. 5 Society's concerns
are not merely paternalistic, but rather reflect an awareness that the
spread of HIV will affect future sexual partners and will act to drain
our national resources.3 6 The proposal advocated in this Comment
is designed to allocate civil liability so as to deter the transmission
of HIV and to minimize the attendant individual and societal costs.
The proposal does not purport to guarantee absolute deterrence on
the part of any individual. Rather, it adds a marginal disincentive
to engaging in risky behavior which, when applied to numerous
actors, will in the aggregate reduce the frequency of unreasonably
risky conduct.
Although it is nearly impossible to quantify the additional
hesitancy that civil liability can induce, even small marginal
disincentives can confer tremendous benefits. Because the disease
spreads exponentially, 7 deterring one risky sexual encounter can
translate into multiple prevented transmissions. In a pandemic that
deter unsafe behavior, behavior modification or its variant, social learning theory
seems the closest fit"). Even if tort law does not directly induce individuals to act in
a particular way, tort verdicts publicized in the mass media may modify social mores.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIDS: SExuAL BEHAVIOR AND INTRAVENOUS DRUG
USE 290 (Charles F. Turner et al. eds., 1989) (noting that "people are less likely to
behave in ways that will incur the disapproval of others in their social group; people
tend to conform to the 'shoulds' and 'oughts' of behavior specified in the norms of
their community"); Shuman, supra note 32, at 126 (stating that "[w]henjury verdicts
are communicated to decisionmakers it is often through word of mouth or the
popular press").
35 Cf. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 27-28 (discussing the need
for behavioral intervention).
36 See GOULD, supra note 4, at 205 (noting that the AIDS pandemic "means a
redirection of funds to the compassionate tasks of caring for those in the terminal
stages of affliction, and to the enlargement of healthcare systems already gravely
overstressed"); id. at 187 ("'Just as a human body with some defect in the cellular
units that confer protection against disease suffers by becoming diseased, so, too,
when a society's individual components have immune defects, the entire society can
be seen to suffer a morbid consequence.'" (quoting William O'Connor, M.D.)). As
Professor John Mansfield notes,
All individual action bears mediately or immediately on the welfare of the
community and any distinction between public and private interests is at
best a matter of degree. Seizing on this truth, the law could define goals for
individual and society and, in regard to all conduct, set forth rules judged
likely to lead to their achievement.
Mansfield, supra note 9, at 23; see also id. at 41 (noting that informed choice may not
be "found likely to lead to a socially desirable result").
" See Mortality Update, supra note 2, at 483 (presenting figures indicating the
nearly exponential growth of HIV-related deaths).
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afflicted eighty thousand people in the past year alone,s8 even a
five percent decrease in the rate of infection would translate into
thousands of lives saved. The following discussion identifies
conditions that are necessary for the law to exert a deterrent
influence on individual behavior.
2. Cases Brought to Trial
Courts cannot adjudicate cases that are not brought before
them. If cases concerning the sexual transmission of HIV are not
brought to trial, the courts will have no opportunity to articulate
legal principles that aspire to influence behavior. There will also be
no corresponding publicity to warn individuals about the potential
consequences of their actions." Given that very few lawsuits for
the sexual transmission of HIV have been brought to date, 40 one
might infer that courts will not have adequate opportunities to play
a role in deterring individuals from spreading HIV.4' There are,
however, explanations for the current dearth of negligence actions
in the AIDS arena that, once explored, imply that the number of
AIDS-related suits will increase in the future.
I See Laurie Garrett, Study: Saliva Stops AIDS, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),Jan. 31, 1995, at
A14 (noting that "[o]ver 80,000 Americans came down with AIDS in 1994"); see also
MARY E. HOMBS, AIDS CRISIS IN AMERICA 83 (1992) (writing in 1992 that "more than
100 people in the United States die of AIDS [every day], or 1 every 15 minutes").
" Although individuals may not be aware of each court decision, mass-media
coverage will bring the courts' message into the home. Cf William L. Earl &Judith
Kavanaugh, Meeting the AIDS Epidemic in the Courtroom: Practical Suggestions in
Litigating Your First AIDS Case, 12 NOvA L. REV. 1203, 1220 (1988) (warning AIDS
litigators of the media attention that accompanies AIDS cases); Arthur S. Leonard,
Ethical Challenges of HIV Infection in the Workplace, 5 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 53, 54 (1990) (noting that by asserting their legal rights, HIV-infected persons
subject themselves to publicity). This may be viewed as a second-order effect of
litigation. Cf NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 19 (stating that "[t]he
mass media can play an important role in providing information about risk.., and
the norms of the community"); id. at 268 (noting that "there can be little doubt that
the media play important roles in transmitting factual information and in helping to
create a social climate conducive to the successful change of health-related conduct").
'0 The two reported cases involving causes of action for the negligent sexual
transmission of HIV are Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich.) (holding
that a defendant will be held liable for transmission of HIV if he had knowledge that
he was infected), cause dismissed sub nom. Moore v.Johnson, 826 F. Supp. 1106 (W.D.
Mich. 1993), and C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
the defendant was not liable for the transmission of HIV because it was not
reasonable for him to have knowledge that he was HIV-positive in 1985).
41 Even if legislatures were to enact statutes granting a private cause of action for
the negligent sexual transmission of HIV, the statutes could only be enforced through
lawsuits.
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Before HIV testing became common,12 individuals did not find
out that they were infected with HIV until they had full-blown
AIDS.4" By that time, their life expectancy was reduced to approxi-
mately two years." The HIV-infected individual's proximity to
death presumably dampened her desire to sue. The seropositive
plaintiff would have had to bear the socioeconomic costs associated
with litigation, without assurance that she would reap the benefits
of a favorable judgment. Even if she were able to win the suit, she
would not be assured of collecting from the defendant, who himself
would probably be in no condition to hold ajob. As one commen-
tator noted: "Because most individual defendants will have been ill
and not working themselves, and will not have insurance for the
liability of negligent transmission of an infectious disease, collecting
on ajudgment probably will be difficult."45
This disinclination to sue would have been equally powerful
whether the plaintiff's motives were monetary or whether they were
punitive, moral, or retributive. In any situation, the person who
communicated the virus to the plaintiff necessarily contracted the
disease before her, making it possible that by the time the plaintiff
discovered her disease and initiated litigation, the defendant would
either be deceased or so ill as to be indifferent to the moral rami-
fications of the suit.4 6 Furthermore, the true moral condemnation
or retribution would not occur until the suit ripened to judgment,
at which time the likelihood that the defendant would have died or
become too ill to appreciate the ramifications of the negligence
suit would be even greater. Given these facts, and the fact that
42 See David P.T. Price, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Charting a Course to Reconcile
the Duty of Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn in the AIDS Context, 94 DICK. L. REV.
435, 473 (1990) (stating that "[ajnonymous reporting can be expected to increase the
numbers of persons requesting HIV testing"); see also HOMBS, supra note 38, at 88
(stating that 1.3 million people were tested in 1990, representing an increase in the
number of low-risk individuals being tested).
43 See PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4, at 23 (stating that "many people-
primarily, of course, those who have had an HIV test and learned the (positive)
result-know that they are infected (and infective) long before they become
symptomatic"); Hermann, supra note 31, at 156 (stating that problems arose in
lawsuits because "the plaintiff [did] not even know that he or she [was] infected until
well after exposure to the virus").
"' See Green, supra note 14, at 30 ("AIDS is fatal, on average, two years after
diagnosis.").
4' Kathryn Kelly, Negligence and Intentional Torts, in AIDS AND THE LAW 149, 159
(William H.L. Dornette ed., 1987).
' See id. at 158 (noting that "[t]he long latency period.., makes it possible that
the defendant will be deceased by the time the suit is brought").
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individuals with full-blown AIDS are likely to experience reduced
capacities,7 negligently infected individuals would not have been
predisposed to bring costly, lengthy, laborious lawsuits in an era
when the unavailability of testing increased the delay between HIV
transmission and the plaintiff's discovery of her HIV infection.
Additional evidentiary and substantive obstacles have impeded
suits for the negligent sexual transmission of HIV. On an evidentia-
ry level, without access to a prompt, reliable, widely accessible
method of determining one's HIV status, individuals typically did
not discover that they were HIV-infected until ten years after the
transmission. 8 This long latency period increased the chance that
the plaintiff would have had additional opportunities to be exposed
to the virus, making it harder for her to prove that her contact with
the defendant was the source of her infection. Indeed, if the
defendant had not tested positive for HIV until after his last sexual
encounter with the plaintiff, which was likely during the period
before testing was common, the defendant could argue that he had
contracted the disease either from the plaintiff or at some time after
his last contact with her.
49
On a substantive level, if the plaintiff contracted the disease
before 1986, her sexual partner's conduct was probably not
considered negligent. Before that year, information on HIV had
not been nationally disseminated. 0 The potential defendant,
therefore, would have had no reason to know that he was posing a
danger to the potential plaintiff.5 "
47 
See WILLIAM CURRAN ET AL., ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME: LEGAL
AND REGULATORY POLICY 348 (1986) ("Incompetency among patients with HTLV-III
infection is an increasingly serious problem. It is estimated that up to 40-50% of
AIDS patients may have loss of higher cerebral function."); Gostin, supra note 26, at
64 ("It is estimated that 40 to 50 percent of AIDS patients may experience some loss
of higher cerebral function.").
"' Ten years has been the average delay between contracting HIV and entering the
AIDS stage of the disease, when symptoms emerge and alert the individual to the
possibility of infection. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
"9 See Kelly, supra note 45, at 157-58 (stating that the blood test "proves, at most,
that the defendant has been exposed at the time of the test, not that he had been at
the time of his contact with the plaintiff," allowing defendants to "argue that the
plaintiffhad exposed her, rather than vice versa"). Unlike the other obstacles to suit,
this evidentiary problem could be overcome upon a showing that the plaintiffhad no
other opportunity to contract HIV.
50 See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 11; see also Michael L. Closen,
Mandatory Disclosure of HlV Blood Test Results to the Individuals Tested: A Matter of
Personal Choice Neglected, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 457-58 (1991) (noting that "[t]he
Surgeon General's pamphlet on HIV/AIDS was mailed to almost every household in
the United States").
51 See, e.g., C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441,444 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("Based on
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Most of the above-mentioned deterrents to bringing actions for
the negligent sexual transmission of HIV, however, have decreased
in recent years, and are still declining. Suspicions about one's own
HIV status are arising sooner in the course of the disease as
national knowledge of the symptoms of the disease increases.5 2 In
addition, it is becoming more likely that individuals will get an HIV
test when these suspicions arise." Thus, the gap between becom-
ing infected and discovering one's HIV status is decreasing, making
it easier for plaintiffs to isolate the particular person who infected
them. This reduced evidentiary obstacle improves a plaintiffs
likelihood of prevailing in a negligence suit, thus increasing the
chance that she will find the filing of such a suit worthwhile.
Earlier awareness of infection increases incentives to sue in
several other ways. First, the opportunity to sue at an earlier stage
of the disease allows more individuals to survive until the comple-
tion of a suit, providing plaintiffs a greater opportunity to reap the
benefits of monetary awards. Compounding the impact of earlier
detection is the recent availability of AZT and 3TC, drugs which
increase the life span of HIV-infected individuals. 4 The longer life
span of both plaintiffs and defendants increases the number of years
in which the plaintiff may find litigation a viable option.
Second, earlier detection of the plaintiff's HIV status will mean
that the defendant will also be in an earlier stage of the disease
when the suit is brought. The better health of the defendant at the
time of the suit makes it more likely that the defendant will still be
working or will have depleted fewer of his resources on his own
medical care. This fact will make it more worthwhile for the
plaintiff to sue than when delayed detection and the absence of
... the information available to the general public through the time the parties ended
their sexual contact, it was not reasonable for [defendant] to have constructive
knowledge he might have AIDS, or that he was capable of transmitting the disease to
[the plaintiff].").
52 See Richard A. Knox, Awareness of AIDS Low, Expert Warns, BOSTON GLOBE,Jan.
31, 1995, at 1, 36 (stating that a recent study of 2500 newly diagnosed HIV-infected
individuals revealed that more than 40% were tested before experiencing AIDS-
related symptoms). Although this Comment recognizes that significant numbers of
people do not get tested until they are sick, the 40% who are tested while healthy
represents a significant increase over the rates of testing in the early years of the
pandemic.
" See supra note 42.
5 See NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, AIDS: 100 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
11 (1994) (mentioning several medical practices and medications for lengthening the
life of HIV-infected individuals); see also supra note 25 (discussing the effects of AZT
and 3TC on the immune system).
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treatment left most defendants penniless and thus judgment-proof
by the time of the suit.
Third, noneconomic, retributive, and moral incentives to sue
also increase as earlier detection and improved treatments leave
defendants healthier at the time of potential litigation. Unlike sickly
defendants who might be indifferent to the consequences of having
past conduct brought to public light or their assets depleted by an
adverse judgment, healthier defendants are more likely to be living
a superficially normal life in the eyes of colleagues and acquain-
tances. This may increase plaintiffs' desires to make them face the
consequences of their negligent conduct. Similarly, a defendant's
better health when a plaintiff discovers her infection increases the
likelihood that the defendant will be continuing to place other
sexual partners at risk during the time when the plaintiff is
considering whether to sue. This could add a moral component to
a plaintiff's outrage and desire to punish, publicize, and deter the
defendant's conduct.
A final growing incentive for plaintiffs to sue is the enhanced
likelihood of proving defendants' negligence, thus making suits
more worthwhile for plaintiffs in general. Increasingly, the sexual
contact at issue will have occurred after the national dissemination
of AIDS information in 1986,"5 making it more likely that ajury will
find the defendant negligent for failing to protect sexual partners
from infection.56
Some might think that suits would be frustrated by the privacy
issues5 7 and confidentiality statutes 8 associated with AIDS. In
55See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See Scott Burrs, Education to Reduce the Spread of HIV, in AIDS LAW TODAY,
supra note 3, at 82, 90-91 (stating that "[s]urveys indicate that, by 1991, most
Americans were familiar with the fundamentals of AIDS: how the disease is
transmitted and what people need to do to protect themselves"); see also infra text
accompanying notes 79-89 (discussing the relationship between the defendant's
knowledge of his HIV infection and the duty of care he owes to his sexual partners).
'7 In the AIDS context, the notion of privacy includes "the right to have one's
records protected from unconsented disclosure to the general public." ABA REPORT,
supra note 7, at 103 (footnote omitted).
5 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.5131 (West 1992); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2785 (McKinney 1993). For several reasons, society has determined that one's
medical records, as far as they relate to HIV, are private and should remain
confidential. See ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 104 (noting that confidentiality refers
to private information that is revealed with the expectation that it will not be further
disseminated); id. at 105 (noting that confidentiality protections exist to encourage
individuals to get tested for HIV antibodies and to seek and receive treatment and
counseling if necessary).
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reality, however, these factors do not pose fatal impediments to
AIDS litigation. Confidentiality of the defendant's medical records
can be waived when other societal concerns outweigh the confiden-
tiality interests." Plaintiffs' concerns about publicizing their own
HIV status or sexual history in the course of litigation" are easily
addressed through procedural safeguards such as allowing anony-
mous suits.6 Thus, for numerous reasons, former disincentives to
initiate AIDS litigation are declining, suggesting that civil litigation
for the negligent sexual transmission of HIV will increase in the
future.
3. Clear and Consistent Rules
The likelihood that an increasing number of HIV-transmission
cases will occupy the legal system suggests that the courts will have
an opportunity to define substantive legal principles geared toward
reducing the spread of HIV. To serve its deterrent role most
effectively, the law must articulate clear and consistent liability
rules.62 Ambiguities in the liability standards within a jurisdiction,
as well as conflicting standards among jurisdictions, leave open the
possibility that a defendant could engage in risky conduct without
necessarily inviting liability. Accordingly, individuals would be more
inclined to engage in activities they prefer. Clearer rules would
make individuals more aware of the adverse consequences of certain
risky behaviors, inducing them to rethink their choices and possibly
to take precautions."
" See, e.g., Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 534 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989), aff'd, 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992) (applying a balancing test to determine whether
the need to know HIV status outweighs privacy interests); see also ABA REPORT, supra
note 7, at 106 (noting that "[c]onfidentiality may be lost in a litigation context
through compliance with a subpoena or other discovery device"); SHARON RENNERT,
AIDS/HIV AND CONFIDENTIALITY: MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURES 69-73 (John
Parry & Robert Horowitz eds., 1991) (suggesting that confidentiality be waived if a
health care professional believes that a person to whom confidentiality would other-
wise attach is at high risk of spreading HIV to sexual or needle-sharing partners).
60 See HOMBS, supra note 38, at 129 (stating that "[b]ecause of the stigma that has
been associated with AIDS, many afflicted with the disease or who are infected with
the AIDS virus are reluctant to be identified with AIDS").
61 See, e.g., Doe v.Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich.) (plaintiff proceeding
anonymously), cause dismissed sub nom. Moore v. Johnson, 826 F. Supp. 1106 (W.D.
Mich. 1993); Doe v. Hirsch, 731 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same).
62 See Shuman, supra note 32, at 123 (stating that "[b]ecause of the importance of
certainty in deterrence theory, tort law should articulate a clear, understandable
standard of behavior that is communicated to decisionmakers who can then modify
their behavior to avoid the tort sanctions that will otherwise accrue").
61 See, e.g., D. Bruce Burlington, An Overview from the Director of the Center for
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In sum, tort law has significant potential to deter risky behavior
and thus to curb the spread of HIV. All of tort law rests on the
principle that legal sanctions can deter individuals from imposing
unreasonable risks on others." In the context of AIDS, numerous
factors portend an increasing incidence of potential tort suits.65
Thus, courts will be squarely confronted with issues of allocating
liability in cases involving the sexual transmission of HIV. They will
be charged with articulating substantive liability rules with sufficient
clarity and consistency to guide parties' conduct.66 Before examin-
ing how these substantive rules can allocate liability most effectively,
the following sections will explain how traditional tort principles
would assign liability for the negligent sexual transmission of HIV.
B. The Prima Facie Case for the Negligent Sexual
Transmission of HIV
1. The Negligence Cause of Action
Negligence actions bring about desired societal effects by
imposing liability on those persons whose conduct "falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm."67 To recover from a defendant
alleged to have created an unreasonable risk in violation of these
standards, a plaintiff must prove the following four elements of a
Devices and Radiological Health, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 175, 176-77 (1994) (stating that
to ensure that regulated parties "know what is expected of them, clear and consistent
criteria.., will be established"); Brent Nicholson, Recent Delaware Case Law Regarding
Director's Duties to Bondholders, 19 DEL.J. CORP. L. 573, 591 (1994) (stating that clear
and consistent definitions must be developed to allow entities to "more easily
determine when their duties shift"); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling Competition
and Cooperation: A New Antitrust Standard forJoint Ventures, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
871, 941 (1994) (stating that the courts' inability to develop a clear and consistent
rule has "needlessly deterred" firms from certain socially desirable actions).
See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing evolving incentives in
tort litigation).
" See supra notes 62-63. Among the benefits of the comparative knowledge
proposal set forth in this Comment is its potential to cure ambiguities that pervade
the current assumption of risk doctrine. The clarity and consistency benefits of this
proposal are discussed infra note 214 and accompanying text.
6 7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). Other potential causes of
action for the sexual transmission of HIV include "battery, fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion, negligent misrepresentation, [and] intentional infliction of emotional distress
.... " Linda K. Burdt & Robert S. Caldwell, Note, The Real Fatal Attraction: Civil and
Criminal Liability for the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 657, 664
(1987-1988).
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prima facie negligence case:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the
[defendant] to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for
the protection of others ....
2. A failure on the [defendant's] part to conform to the standard
required: a breach of the duty....
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and
the resulting injury....
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of [the plain-
tiff].
68
If the plaintiff proves each of these elements, and the defendant
does not assert an affirmative defense, the plaintiff will prevail.
a. Duty Owed to Plaintiff and Defendant's Breach of That Duty
The question of duty is a legal one. 9  Courts must decide
whether the defendant has exercised due care to ensure that he
does not "unreasonably endanger the person or property of
others."7" Courts have applied, and commentators have discussed,
the duty concept in relation to the sexual transmission of disease.
They generally agree that the defendant owes a duty to everyone
with whom he engages in sexual activity,71 because this is the class
of persons foreseeably injured by defendant's conduct.
72
The nature of the duty that the defendant owes to these sexual
0 KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 30, at 164-65 (emphasis added).
69 See id. § 53, at 356 (stating that duty "may be defined as an obligation, to which
the law will give recognition and effect").
70 Clark v. Dalman, 150 N.W.2d 755, 760 (Mich. 1967); see also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 30, § 31, at 169 (stating that negligence is "conduct 'which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm'" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 282 (1965))).
71 See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77 (Ct. App. 1984)
(finding that a duty exists between sexual partners who are not married, stating that
"a certain amount of trust and confidence exists in any intimate relationship, at least
to the extent that one sexual partner represents to the other that he or she is free
from venereal or other dangerous contagious disease"); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d
103, 107-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that "[p]eople who know that they have
genital herpes" must "exercise reasonable care to avoid injur[ing]... their potential
sexual partners").
72See R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 107 (discussing the duties associated with herpes
transmission, and stating that "[t]he foreseeability of potential injury is a key factor
which courts consider in establishing the scope of the legal duty to use reasonable
care"); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 43, at 280-81 (addressing foreseeable
risk, and noting that "[i]f one could not reasonably foresee any injury as the result of
one's act.., there would be no negligence").
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partners includes informing them of the sexually transmissible
diseases that he carries, 71 giving them "full and accurate informa-
tion" about the disease, 74 and using protective measures to lessen
the risk of transmission. Courts may look to common law,76
criminal statutes,77 and custom7 1 to determine whether this duty
" A leading case involving the sexual transmission of genital herpes discusses the
general duty owed to one's sexual partner, stating that "people suffering from genital
herpes generally have a duty either to avoid sexual contact with uninfected persons
or, at least, to warn potential sex partners that they have herpes before sexual contact
occurs." R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 108; see also MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL., AIDS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 413 (1989) (citing R.A.P.). This duty also arises in the context of
diseases that are not sexually transmitted. "In an early case involving the transmission
of smallpox, the court ruled that once someone was aware of his infection, a duty
arose to keep away from others or to inform them of his disease so that 'they might
protect themselves.'" Kelly, supra note 45, at 152 (quoting Hendricks v. Butcher, 129
S.W. 431, 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910)).
"' Kelly, supra note 45, at 152.
7'5 See Donald H.J. Hermann, Liability Related to Diagnosis and Transmission of AIDS,
15 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 36,41 (1987); see also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra
note 11, at 17 (stating that "[i]f you[] test ... positive [for HIV] or if you engage in
high risk activities and choose not to have a test, you should tell your sexual partner;
[i]f you jointly decide to have sex, you must protect your partner by always using a
rubber (condom)"); Hermann, supra note 31, at 159 (noting that "requiring infected
sexual partners to take reasonable precautions [through the use of civil liability]
constitutes sound social policy").
76 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 32, at 173-74 (noting that in determining
whether a defendant has lived up to the "standard of conduct which the community
demands," courts have "creat[ed] a fictitious person, who never has existed on land
or sea: the 'reasonable man of ordinary prudence.'" (citing Vaughan v. Menlove, 132
Eng. Rep. 490 (1837))).
1 "The standard of conduct required of a reasonable person may be prescribed
by [statute]." KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 36, at 220. As one state statute
provides:
A person who knows that he or she has or has been diagnosed as having
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome or acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome related complex, or who knows that he or she is HIV infected,
and who engages in sexual penetration with another person without having
first informed the other person that he or she has acquired immunodefi-
ciency syndrome or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome related complex
or is HIV infected, is guilty of a felony.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §333.5210(1) (West 1992); see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:43.5 (West Supp. 1995) (prohibiting sexual intercourse by persons knowingly
infected with HIV, unless such person procures informed consent from his sexual
partner).
"When a statute provides that under certain circumstances particular acts shall
or shall not be done, it may be interpreted as fixing a standard for all members of the
community, from which it is negligence to deviate." KEETON ET AL., supra note 30,
§ 36, at 220 (footnote omitted). Statutory standards, even when technically applicable
only to criminal prosecutions, can also guide and inform courts in defining minimum
levels of care in civil suits. See Gostin, supra note 26, at 62-63 (noting that criminal
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has been breached.
With respect to HIV transmission, "there exists a duty to take
whatever steps a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would take
to protect sexual partners from an unreasonable risk of infec-
tion."7 9 The steps a reasonable person would take are directly
dependent on the degree of risk the person thinks he poses to his
sexual partners. Accordingly, courts have recognized that the
defendant's knowledge of his risk of being HIV-positive is an
important element of defining the duty of care the defendant owes.
For example, in Doe v.Johnson,0 the court classified different types
of defendants according to their level of knowledge of their HIV
laws can be used to deter unreasonably risky conduct both indirectly and directly).
Courts look to criminal standards for guidance in civil suits to help further the
ultimate legislative goals and the "community's views" reflected in the statute. See
United States v.Joseph, 37 M.J. 392, 401 (C.M.A. 1993) (concurring opinion) (stating
that criminalization is a statement by a legislative body that an act is socially
unacceptable); Mansfield, supra note 9, at 43 (stating that criminal law "demonstrates
the strength of the community's views"); see also Gostin, supra note 26, at 62 (stating
that the government uses the criminal law as a forward-looking measure aimed at
deterring individuals from unacceptable future behavior that will increase the spread
of HIV).
s Courts may consider custom as some evidence of the level of care that
individuals should maintain. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 33, at 195 (stating
that "as a general rule, the fact that a thing is done in an unusual manner [against
custom] is merely evidence to be considered in determining negligence, and is not in
itself conclusive"). But see id. (noting that "where common knowledge and ordinary
judgment will recognize unreasonable danger, what everyone does [custom] may be
found negligent"). Professor Keeton notes:
Since the standard [of care that sets a duty] is a community standard,
evidence of the usual and customary conduct of others under similar
circumstances is normally relevant and admissible, as an indication of what
the community regards as proper, and a compositejudgment as to the risks
of the situation and the precautions required to meet them.... If the actor
does only what everyone else has done, there is at least an inference that the
actor is conforming to the community's idea of reasonable behavior.
Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted).
In the area of AIDS law, it may be customary for individuals that engage in
sexual activity with multiple partners to use condoms. Cf GOULD, supra note 4, at 48
(stating that "condom use.., has soared in the last decade"). But see id. at 36 (noting
that "[iln many parts of the United States, 70 percent of the teenage population have
experienced sexual intercourse before leaving high school, and half of them use no
contraception whatsoever"); Burris, supra note 56, at 91 (stating that "[o]ne study
found that college undergraduates actually increased their levels of unsafe sexual
behavior between 1986 and 1988, despite an increase in their general knowledge of
HIV").
9 Hermann, supra note 31, at 159.
o 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich.), cause dismissed sub nom. Moore v.Johnson, 826
F. Supp. 1106 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
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status.81 For the purposes of this Comment, both parties' levels of
knowledge are grouped into the following four categories:
1. Ignorance-that is, a party does not know, or have reason to
know, of her or her partner's HIV status because she never
engaged in risky activity and has no reason to believe that her
partner engaged in risky activity.
2. Suspicion-that is, a plaintiff suspects that the defendant could
be HIV-positive, or the defendant suspects that he is HIV-
positive, because the defendant has engaged in risky sexual
activity.
3. Imputed Awareness-that is, the plaintiff should be aware of the
defendant's, or the defendant should be aware of his own,
HIV-positive status because of publicity on AIDS, and the fact
that the party discovers that the defendant has physical
manifestations of the disease.
4. Awareness-that is, plaintiff is aware of defendant's, or the
defendant is aware of his own, HIV status, because the party
is aware that defendant tested positive for HIV.
Defendants with imputed or actual knowledge or awareness
would probably be liable for negligently transmitting HIV if they
"' The court found that the likelihood that the defendant was posing an
unreasonable risk depended on which of the following degrees of knowledge he
possessed:
1) A defendant knows s/he has the HIV virus because s/he has been
affirmatively diagnosed bya medical professional as having the disease;
2) A defendant knows that s/he has the HIV virus because s/he has
specific knowledge of any particular facts, such as:
a) The defendant has experienced symptoms related to the HIV
virus; or,
b) The defendant has come in contact with an individual, or several
individuals, who have been diagnosed as having the HIV virus and
defendant has engaged in conduct with such persons which results
in a likelihood (or even a possibility) that s/he could have the
disease because of such conduct;
3) A defendant has engaged in "high risk" conduct which may result in
exposure to the HIV virus, such as a great deal of unprotected sexual
contact with multiple partners; [or] unprotected anal intercourse with
multiple partners ....
4) A defendant has engaged in conduct which may result in exposure to
the HIV virus, such as unprotected sexual relations with one partner
(who had unprotected sexual relations with at least one other person).
Id. at 1388-89. The first three knowledge designations adopted by Doe are analogous
to the levels of culpability espoused in the Model Penal Code (MPC): purpose (aware
of existence of condition), knowledge (aware that it is practically certain that circum-
stances exist), and recklessness or negligence (should be aware that circumstances
exist). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1985). In Doe, however, the labels denote
levels of knowledge, not culpability.
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failed to protect or warn their sexual partners, because reasonable
persons would not knowingly risk endangering another person's life
without that person's consent.8 2 When a defendant possesses a
lesser degree of knowledge, such as a suspicion or ignorance, other
factors help resolve whether the defendant's actions were reasonable
under the circumstances. These factors might include:
1. The burden the rule places on the defendant 3
2. The foreseeability that the plaintiff will be harmed."4
3. The severity of the potential harm. 5
4. The net effect that the allocation of liability will have on
society.
8 6
5. The parties' relationship.
8 7
6. The moral reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.8
s See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
s See id.; see also Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 234 (La. 1994) (noting in a
herpes transmission case that the "burden of prevention" is one factor to be
considered in applying the reasonable person test to determine duty). The burden
placed on defendant would be low compared with the severity of the harm of HIV
transmission, because all he needs to do is say "I have AIDS" or "I may be HIV-
positive because I have engaged in high-risk activity." See R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d
103, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that in the case of herpes, "the three words
'I have herpes' will be sufficient in most cases to give fair notice of the danger of
infection"). Similarly, the use of a condom is easy and inexpensive, and any marginal
reduction in enjoyment is far outweighed by the great decrease in the probability of
transmitting or being exposed to a deadly infection.
s See Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1387; see also Meany, 639 So. 2d at 234 (noting that in
determining reasonableness, courts should consider "the likelihood of the harm").
' See Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1386; see also Meany, 639 So. 2d at 234 (considering the
"gravity of harm" when evaluating negligence).
' See Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1391-92; see also Meany, 639 So. 2d at 234 (noting that
"the social utility of the defendant's conduct" should be considered when determining
negligence). This consideration might embrace the competing societal interests in
individual privacy and preventing the spread of diseases. See Doe, 817 F. Supp. at
1391-92.
87 See Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1391.
See id. at 1387. Weighing these factors to assess the negligence of the
defendant's sexual transmission of HIV follows a formula fundamental to tort law.
This formula, espoused byJudge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), holds that a defendant's harmful conduct violates a duty
of care when the burden of preventing the harm is less than the product of the
probability harm will occur without precautions and the amount of resulting injury.
See id. at 173. Among the factors identified above, the first three measure,
respectively, the burden of preventing HIV transmission, the probability of infecting
another, and the severity of the direct harm to the plaintiff. Factor four recognizes
the societal implications of liability rules relating to the spread of HIV; factor five
acknowledges that duties arise in particular circumstances and are not independent
of the relationship between the parties involved; and factor six acknowledges society's
desire to punish those who are more culpable.
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All of these factors help to define when the defendant has
breached a duty of care in his sexual contact with the plaintiff,
making him liable for the HIV-associated harms he inflicts.
Defendants with suspicion-those who engage in high-risk conduct-
may or may not be liable depending on how the court weighs the six
factors previously mentioned.89 A defendant who is "ignorant" of
his HIV status because he engaged in isolated acts of unprotected
sex with persons whom he reasonably believed were HIV-negative
would generally escape liability because the foreseeability and moral
reprehensibility of his actions are low compared with the burden
that would be placed on him.
Two courts have addressed the duty element in the context of
the sexual transmission of HIV. The more recent is the 1993
federal district court decision in Doe v. Johnson." In that case, Ms.
Doe and Mr. Johnson engaged in consensual sexual behavior on the
evening ofJune 22, 1990, and on the following morning.91 Ms. Doe
claims that prior to the first sexual act, she asked the defendant to
use a condom, but he refused to do so.92 She later tested positive
for the HIV antibody,9" and sued seeking monetary damages for the
negligent transmission of HIV.94
The plaintiff based her negligence count on the claim that the
"defendant negligently breached a legal duty he owed [her] not to
transmit the HIV virus to her because he knew or should have
known that he had the HIV virus."95 She contended that the
defendant should have known that he had HIV because his
"'sexual[ly] active' lifestyle... 'put him at high risk' to contract the
HIV virus."96 The court concluded that a duty should not attach
89 SeeDoe, 817 F. Supp. at 1396 (holding thata defendant who engages in high-risk
behavior, and who also suffers from symptoms associated with AIDS, would have a
duty to take reasonable precautions to protect his sexual partners from transmission
of the virus); see also id. at 1388 (characterizing unprotected sexual contact and anal
intercourse with multiple partners as high-risk activities).
o 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich.), cause dismissed sub nom. Moore v.Johnson, 826
F. Supp. 1106 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
91 See id. at 1385.
9 See id.
'3 See id.
' See id. at 1384-85. This was only one of the plaintiff's numerous causes of
action. Her other claims included "Breach of duty not to transmit HIV virus ...
Battery... Fraud/Failure to warn (of HIV status) ... Fraud/Failure to warn (of
sexually active lifestyle) ... Strict Liability ... Loss of consortium [for her infant,
and] ... intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 1384-85.
95 Id. at 1386.
Id. at 1387 (quoting the defendant's response to the plaintiff's complaint)
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to a defendant merely because he had engaged in high-risk
activity.9 7 The court noted, however, that high-risk activity com-
bined with possible symptoms of HIV infection would be sufficient
to satisfy the duty element. 8 A defendant aware of this combina-
tion of behavioral and medical indications of HIV risk would then
have "a duty to act as a reasonable person under the circumstances,"
including the duty to "go to a medical professional, have an HIV
virus test, refrain from sexual activity, warn sex partners, wear a
condom during sexual contact, etc."
99
The second case demonstrating the application of the duty
prong of the prima facie negligence case is the 1989 Minnesota
Court of Appeals decision in C.A.U. v. R.L. ° ° The plaintiff,
C.A.U., met the defendant, R.L., in May of 1984.1' The parties
engaged in sexual relations that ceased in April of 1985,102 one
month after the defendant sought medical help for symptoms
commonly associated with HIV.10 3 Physicians did not inform R.L.
that he might be seropositive until October of 1985; in December
of 1985 the medical doctors confirmed their suspicions.
10 4
R.L. claimed that he was not aware that the disease existed until
July of 1985.05 He also claimed that he informed C.A.U. about
(alteration in original).
" See id. at 1394 (stating that "[there is no duty.., to disclose 'high risk' activity
... without more"). The court defines high-risk activity as "'unprotected anal sex;
unprotected vaginal sex; unprotected oral/genital and oral/anal sex; unprotected sex
with many partners; [or] having sex while drunk or high.'" Id. at 1390-91 (citation
omitted).
" See id. at 1396. The court stated:
[I]f defendant had unprotected sexual contact with multiple partners (as is
alleged) and suffered symptoms related to the HIV virus that could be
construed as "common maladies" (e.g., headaches, nondescript spots on
body, weakness and fatigue, shingles, etc.), then this Court would find that
defendant did in fact have a duty to act as a reasonable person under the
circumstances ....
Id.
99 Id.
'- 438 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendant on the grounds that the defendant had no
actual or constructive knowledge of his infection with HIV at the time of his sexual
contact with plaintiff in 1985).
101 See id. at 442.
102 See id.
... See id. (noting that the defendant experienced "headaches, spots on his legs,
weakness and fatigue").
104 See id.
1o5 See id.
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his condition in January of 1986.1"' C.A.U., on the other hand,
asserted that in April of 1985 R.L. affirmatively represented to her
that he was not HIV-positive."'0 C.A.U. eventually tested positive
for the HIV antibody and sued to recover damages attributable to
the defendant's alleged negligent transmission of the virus.108
The trial court found that R.L. did not owe C.A.U. a duty and
dismissed the action on a motion for summary judgment.'0 9 On
appeal, C.A.U. argued that because her injuries were foreseeable,
R.L. owed her a duty, making the dismissal below erroneous." 0 She
maintained that "given that [the defendant] allegedly had previous
homosexual contacts, he should have known that his sexual
relationship with [the plaintiff] would result in injury.""' The
court of appeals rejected this contention, stating that "[b]ased on
the affidavits submitted by [the defendant's] physicians, and the
information available to the general public through the time the
parties ended their sexual contact, it was not reasonable for [the
defendant] to have constructive knowledge he might have AIDS, or
that he was capable of transmitting the disease to [the plain-
tiff]."" 2 The court did, however, agree that the proper test for
determining whether a duty attaches would include the consider-
ation of whether the harm was foreseeable."
3
This duty and breach analysis highlights the element of the
prima facie case most central to this Comment, which ultimately
focuses on whether the plaintiff or the defendant is better situated
to know of and prevent the risk of transmitting HIV. The following
sections, however, will summarize the other elements of the
negligence cause of action as they apply to the sexual transmission
of HIV. This discussion will elucidate the factual contexts in which
the courts will be deciding issues of plaintiffs' and defendants'
relative knowledge of, and responsibility for, the risk of the sexual
transmission of HIV.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 See id.
10 See id. at 443 (noting plaintiff's contention that she had stated "a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether [the defendant] should have known he was a likely
carrier of the AIDS virus").
"I Id.
1 12 Id. at 444.
11 See id. (holding that the defendant had no duty to warn the plaintiff he was
HIV-positive because "at the time of the parties' relationship it was not reasonably
foreseeable that he had the disease").
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b. Causation
i. Cause in Fact
To succeed in a claim for negligent transmission of HIV, a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant's actions were the cause in
fact"4 and the proximate cause'1 5 of her contracting the virus. In
general, courts consider whether the defendant's act was a necessary
antecedent to the plaintiffs harm in the sense that the harm would
not have occurred but for the defendant's acts." 6 This "but-for" test
of causation in fact governs when only one person's actions
contribute to the harm, as is usually the case in HIV transmis-
sion.
1 7
14 "'Cause in fact' embraces all things which have so far contributed to the result
that without them it would not have occurred." KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 41,
at 265; see also id. § 41, at 269 (stating that the plaintiff must show that "it is more
likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the [harm]").
n' Proximate causation turns on whether the defendant's "conduct has been so
significant and important a cause that the defendant should be legally responsible."
Id. § 42, at 273.
116 See id. § 41, at 266 (noting that "[t]he defendant's conduct is a cause of the
event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the
defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred
without it").
117 In more complex scenarios, when two or more defendants simultaneously cause
a harm and either one alone would have been sufficient to do so, courts often employ
the substantial-factor test. See id. § 41, at 267 (stating that the defendant's conduct
is a cause in fact of the harm if his conduct is a "material element and a substantial
factor in bringing [the harm] about"). Courts may also apply a revised version of the
but-for test:
When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that their
combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event, and
application of the but-for rule to them individually would absolve all of
them, the conduct of each is a cause in fact of the event.
Id. § 41, at 268.
In the context of HIV transmission, these tests could become relevant when a
plaintiff, after the initial infection, is either reinfected with HIV or is infected with
another disease, such that her life is shortened by the combined effects of the two
infections. See PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4, at 23 (noting that "[s]ome
biologists and physicians believe that reinfection with a different strain of this highly
mutable virus [HIV] places the body's immune system under additional stress and so
accelerates conversion to the active disease state, thus shortening life"); see also Earle
v. Kuklo, 98 A.2d 107, 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953) (acknowledging a cause
of action for negligence that results in the transmission of tuberculosis); Brett-Smith
& Friedland, supra note 3, at 34 (stating that "[o]ther infectious diseases that may be
related to a high-risk lifestyle (such as syphilis, hepatitis, and tuberculosis) may also
become active [during the symptomatic stage of HIVI and may be more difficult to
treat than they would otherwise have been in a non-HIV infected person"). In these
complex cases, the plaintiff will die from the effects of the combination of two
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Thus, in tort actions for the negligent sexual transmission of
HIV, the plaintiff must generally prove that, but for the defendant's
actions or omissions in the course of their sexual relations, she
would not have incurred the harms related to HIV."' Proving this
element may present difficult evidentiary problems. n9 First, a
plaintiff may not discover that she is infected with HIV until years
after exposure. 2 Even if the plaintiff seeks an HIV-antibody test
immediately after contact with the defendant, she will not get an
accurate reading for up to six months.' If the plaintiff has other
partners during the six-month period, it may be difficult for the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant was the cause of the viral
transmission.22 It may also be difficult for the plaintiff to show
viruses; both defendants' acts could be considered substantial factors causing the
plaintiff's suffering and eventual death. Similarly, the plaintiff would not have
suffered in the manner she did but for the acts of both defendants. Thus, each
defendant's act would be a cause in fact of the harm.
"8A causal connection must exist between the defendant's negligent actions and
the plaintiff's harm. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 41, at 263 (stating that "[ain
essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence.., is that there be
some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the
damages which the plaintiff has suffered"). For example, if a defendant's duty were
to warn the plaintiff of his possible HIV infection, she would have to show that but
for his failure to disclose his risk of disease, she would not have incurred HIV-related
harms. This would probably require a showing that if he had disclosed his possible
HIV-positive status, she would have refrained from sexual contact or would have used
a condom. Such a showing requires the plaintiff to prove something inherently
speculative and thus presents a significant evidentiary obstacle. To mitigate the harsh
consequences for the plaintiff, the courts could treat the defendant's disclosure to the
plaintiff as a defense rather than a defect in the prima facie case.
n9 In the AIDS context, the evidentiary difficulties in ruling out other possible
sources of infection are steadily declining. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying
text (explaining that increased use of HIV tests is reducing delay between time of HIV
transmission and discovery of infection, decreasing the number of sexual partners to
whom the viral contraction might be attributed).
120 See Hermann, supra note 31, at 161 ("The virus may lay dormant in a person
for years. It is therefore often difficult, if not impossible, to determine how long
someone has been infected prior to the discovery of positive antibody status. .. ").
' See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting that HIV antibodies are not
detectable until one to six months after transmission of the virus).
" Note that the plaintiff need not eliminate other possible causes to an absolute
certainty, but rather need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant was more likely than not the cause of the harm. See KEETON ET AL., supra
note 30, § 41, at 269 ("[I]t is enough to introduce evidence from which reasonable
persons may conclude that it is more probable that the event was caused by the
defendant than that it was not.").
Courts can also use procedural devices to lower evidentiary barriers. For
instance, a plaintiff could be permitted to name as defendants all persons with whom
she had sexual contact more than six months before her HIV test. The defendants
could then plead out of the suit by proving either that they are not HIV-positive or
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that she was seronegative before the encounter, 12 3 unless she
could prove that all of her prior sexual partners were HIV-negative,
or that she had never previously engaged in high-risk activity.
124
These evidentiary burdens can, however, be surmounted, as the
court demonstrated in Bemer v. Caldwell.125 The Berner court
analyzed issues of causation in a claim for the negligent transmis-
sion of genital herpes. The trial court had dismissed the case on the
grounds that the state did "not recognize an actionable claim for the
contraction of a venereal disease under any sort of circumstanc-
es." 121 On appeal, the court reversed the dismissal, relying on the
plaintiff's claims "that the defendant was the only person with whom
she had sexual contact; that she did not have the disease prior to
their relationship; and that near the end of their relationship she
discovered that she had the disease." 12 Based on these allegations,
the court found that the plaintiff had raised a genuine issue of
that they were not HIV-positive when they engaged in contact with the plaintiff. The
1944 decision in Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944), espoused a similar
test, implying that when the plaintiff cannot know which among several defendants
caused her harm, the defendants are each responsible for demonstrating that their
actions were not the cause. In Ybarra, the plaintiffwas injured while hospitalized and
unconscious. The court stated:
The control at one time or another, of one or more of the various agencies
or instrumentalities which might have harmed the plaintiffwas in the hands
of every defendant or of his employees or temporary servants. This, we
think, places upon them the burden of initial explanation. Plaintiff was
rendered unconscious for the purpose of undergoing surgical treatment by
the defendants; it is manifestly unreasonable for them to insist that [the
plaintiff] identify any one of them as the person who did the alleged
negligent act.
Id. at 690; see also Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (placing burden of
proof on two defendants where it was dear that both unintentionally shot the plaintiff
and that one of the shots caused injury to plaintiff's eye).
11 Unless the plaintiff were completely risk-free before the encounter with the
defendant, isolating the defendant as the cause of the infection would "require[] the
fortuity of either having had an antibody test close in time to the encounter with the
defendant (and no intervening high-risk sex) or having had blood drawn during that
same period that somehow remains available for testing." Hermann, supra note 31,
at 161; see also Hermann, supra note 75, at 41 (stating that "[t]he more.., partners
the plaintiff has had, the more potential sources of virus and the greater difficulty of
proving causation from a particular sexual contact").
124 See Hermann, supra note 75, at 41 ("Causation may be less easy to establish
than breach of duty. Even when one can rule out transmission via contaminated
blood or needles, infection from a sex partner may be hard to prove.")
125 543 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1989).
'
2 6 Id. at 688 (noting the trial court's dismissal of the case on the defendant's
motion for summary judgment).
1
2 7 Id.
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material fact as to whether the defendant was the cause in fact of
the plaintiff's injury.12 In effect, the court held that if a plaintiff
can negate the likelihood that she contracted the disease before or
after her contact with the defendant, she has established causation
in fact.
12 9
ii. Proximate Causation
The proximate cause requirement relieves defendants of liability
if the consequences of their actions are too remote or unforesee-
able."'0 It is not difficult to prove proximate causation once duty
has been established, because the criteria for assessing proximate
causation are similar to those used to determine the existence of a
duty.13 1 In the context of HIV transmission, a proximate relation-
ship between the negligent transmission of the virus and the harms
attributable to HIV will almost inevitably exist. Once the virus is
transmitted it will continue to replicate;13 2 further stages of HIV
128 See id.
'2 It is interesting to note that a small minority of individuals believe that the only
"cause" of AIDS is God's punishment for bad moral character. See Allan M. Brandt,
A Historical Perspective, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC, supra note
10, at 37,43 (stating that some individuals believe that AIDS is caused by homosexual
activity rather than by transmission of a virus). Similar theories have surfaced
throughout history. For instance, in 1912 one woman wrote the following about
syphilis: "'I knew of the disease only through newspaper advertisements [for patent
medicines]. I had understood that it was the result of sin and that it originated and
was contracted only in the underworld of the city.'" Id. at 39 (alteration in original).
so See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 42, at 273 (stating that the "scope of
liability should ordinarily extend to but not beyond all 'direct' (or 'directly traceable')
consequences and those indirect consequences that are foreseeable").
"' The concepts of duty and proximate cause "are interrelated because they both
involve a policy determination of whether a legal obligation should be imposed on the
defendant to protect the plaintiff against the damage the plaintiff actually suffered."
Johnson v. Bobbie's Party Store, 473 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); see also
Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 n.2 (W.D. Mich.) (noting that "under a
negligence action, the issue whether a legal duty exists and the question of proximate
cause often merge"), cause dismissed sub nom. Moore v. Johnson, 826 F. Supp. 1106
(W.D. Mich. 1993); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting) (stating that a finding of proximate causation reflects a
conclusion "that, because of convenience, of public policy, [or] a rough sense of
justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point").
Despite the prevalence of policy concerns over factual realities in fixing notions
of proximate cause, certain legal tests do constrain definitions of proximate causation.
For instance, defendants are not held liable for harm if the harm was partially
attributable to the "deliberate intervention of a third party or some extraordinary
event." H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 90 (2d ed. 1985).
1s
2 See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 3, at 33.
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infection-including full-blown AIDS-are not only foreseeable, they
are inevitable.' A plaintiffs death from opportunistic infections
is also proximately related to the infector's actions, because it is not
considered an extraordinary event, but rather an unavoidable
consequence of the immunosuppression characterized by HIV.'
3
1
c. Real Damages
The final element of the prima facie negligence case requires a
plaintiff to prove that she has suffered actual loss or damage.
135
This requirement is not difficult to satisfy in the context of HIV
transmission.13 Once individuals test positive for HIV, "it is
important to monitor the status of their immune systems."
37
HIV-infected individuals are also encouraged to take AZT,' an
expensive drug that "contain[s] the damage of infection over time
by limiting the reproductive activity of the virus and reducing the
133 See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
's Although individuals who transmit certain diseases to the plaintiff might also
be liable for hastening the plaintiff's death, see supra note 117 (explaining causation
analysis where multiple defendants contribute to plaintiff's harm), the defendant who
transmitted HIV will not completely escape liability.
135 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 30, at 165 (stating that "[n]ominal damages,
to vindicate a technical right, cannot be recovered in a negligence action, where no
actual loss has occurred" and the "threat of future harm, not yet realized," is equally
insufficient).
" The Louisiana Court of Appeals decision in Meany v. Meany, 631 So. 2d 14
(La. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 639 So. 2d 229 (La. 1994), illustrates the
types of damages awarded in cases involving the transmission of a disease. In Meany,
the plaintiff sued her former husband for negligently infecting her with genital herpes
and venereal warts. Thejury found for the plaintiff and awarded her the following
damages:
Past and future pain and suffering $7,500
Past and future mental anguish 50,000
Permanent disability 10,000
Past and future medical expenses 50,000
Loss of society and enjoyment of life 7.500
TOTAL $125,000
Id. at 16. These types of damages are also incurred in the context of AIDS. See infra
note 140 (describing harms related to AIDS). The amount and scope of damages,
however, will likely be higher and broader considering the significantly greater
severity of AIDS as compared with either herpes or venereal warts.
3 Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 3, at 34.
's See supra note 25 (discussing the effect of AZT on HIV); see also Brett-Smith &
Friedland, supra note 3, at 40 (stating that "[o]ver the last five years, early interven-
tion-meaning the initiation of AZT therapy as soon as the T4 cell count drops below
500-has become the standard of care in the United States").
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total burden of HIV in the body.""s9 Once the individual begins
to experience AIDS-related symptoms, medical and monitoring
expenses escalate. 140 The courts that have recognized actions for
the sexual transmission of HIV have indicated that plaintiffs' HIV-
related injuries include "physical illness .... medical expenses....
lost wages and benefits," and a "'slow, certain, and painful
death.'"
14'
2. The Significance of the Negligence Cause of Action
for the Sexual Transmission of HIV
The emerging case law on the negligent sexual transmission of
diseases indicates that "each of us has a legally enforceable duty to
protect our sexual partners against the transmission of venereal and
contagious diseases."142 The few cases that have addressed the
standards for establishing negligence in the HI V-transmission
"' Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 3, at 39.
140 One commentator provided the following example to illustrate the costs of
AIDS:
Imagine a forty-year-old woman. She ... has sight-threatening CMV
retinitis and MAC, which causes fever and diarrhea. Her treatment for
these two problems alone may require daily intravenous therapy, which she
will often have to self-administer at home, and a complicated dosing
schedule of three to five oral medications. She also needs PCP [pneumonia]
prevention, which means either another set of pills each week or a monthly
clinic visit for a breathing treatment. Of course, her treatment for HIV
itself requires several daily doses of... AZT [or similar drugs]. Then there
is her anemia, a complication of her illnesses exacerbated by the toxicities
of the drugs she must take; for this, she injects a hormone under her skin
three times a week.... Meanwhile, she must see a gynecologist every few
months to monitor the abnormal Pap smears .... There is the eye doctor
to be seen monthly. And then there are the visits to her primary doctor,
perhaps only once a month if she is going through a "good" period;
sometimes every two weeks or every week, if she is not.... [T]his is how
many people with HIV disease live the last months and years of their lives.
Id. at 41.
14 Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (W.D. Mich.) (quoting plaintiff's
complaint), cause dismissedsub nom. Moore v.Johnson, 826 F. Supp. 1106 (W.D. Mich.
1993); see also Hermann, supra note 75, at 41 (noting that "where transmission of the
virus leads to destruction of the immune system, there will be a firm basis for
damages for medical expenses and other losses").
142 Hermann, supra note 31, at 158. At the time Hermann wrote his article, there
were no judicial decisions addressing the sexual transmission of HIV. His analysis is
based on the transmission of other diseases; for example, he notes that a leading
genital herpes case held that a defendant is liable for the transmission of the disease
when he knew, or should have known, that he had the disease. See id. (citing
Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1984)).
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context require the defendant to act as a reasonably prudent person
would under the circumstances.14 As the leading cases have
noted, the defendant's degree of knowledge of the risk that he is
HIV-infected is crucial in defining the precautions he reasonably
should take. 1" The greater the defendant's knowledge or suspi-
cion as to his positive HIV status, the more likely it is that he will be
found negligent for declining to inform his partners of the risk that
he is an HIV carrier, for failing to refrain from high-risk behavior,
and for neglecting to use a condom to reduce the likelihood of
transmission.1
45
C. The Assumption of Risk Defense
Once a court finds that a defendant has breached a duty, it will
evaluate any affirmative defenses asserted. One possible defense is
assumption of risk.146 Assumption of risk, which completely bars
the plaintiffs recovery, 147 is successfully invoked when the plaintiff
'4 See Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1386 ("[I]n Michigan the 'duty' or 'standard of care'
imposed on every person, in every situation, is that of a 'reasonably prudent
person.'... That is, a defendant must always do or refrain from doing what a
reasonably prudent person would do or refrain from doing."); C.A.U. v. R.L., 438
N.W.2d 441,443-44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding defendant to a reasonable person
standard and finding that defendant's lack of knowledge about AIDS was reasonable).
14 See supra note 143; see also Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1387-88 (noting that the duty
the defendant owes to his sexual partners turns on the knowledge the defendant
reasonably has as to his positive HIV status); supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text
(discussing the various degrees of knowledge used to define defendant's duty to the
plaintiff).
14' See Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1388 (stating that a defendant with sufficient
knowledge as to his HIV status has a duty not to "engage in unprotected sexual
relations, or at least warn a potential partner of the possibility that [he] may have the
HIV virus").
146 Assumption of risk is one of the few affirmative defenses to the negligence
cause of action. The others are contributory negligence and comparative negligence.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 65, at 451 (stating that "[t]he two most common
defenses in a negligence action are contributory negligence and assumption of risk").
Contributory and comparative negligence are alternatives to one another; each
jurisdiction recognizes either one of or the other. See id. § 67, at 468, 471 (noting
that because of "[t]he hardship of the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the
plaintiff" numerous states have replaced contributory negligence with comparative
negligence). For a history of the assumption of risk defense, see Note, Assumption of
Risk and Strict Products Liability, 95 HARV. L. REV. 872, 875-76 (1982) (stating that the
assumption of risk defense emerged in the employer-employee context on the theory
that employees knowingly assumed risks associated with job-related hazards, thus
precluding employees from holding employers liable for accident costs); see also
Mansfield, supra note 9, at 50-51 (discussing different approaches to assumption of
risk in the employer-employee context in the United States and England).
147 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 481 (noting that assumption of risk
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has agreed, implicitly or explicitly, to accept a risk imposed by the
defendant."4 The plaintiff essentially forfeits her right to sue if
the harm risked is later realized. 49
Assumption of risk is based on the maxim volenti nonfit injuria:
"'[t]o one who is willing no harm is done.'"15° In applying this
principle, assumption of risk theorists seek a balance between the
desire to prevent defendants from shifting risks onto unwilling
plaintiffs15' and the need to prevent plaintiffs from forcing defen-
dants to bear the costs of risks the plaintiffs voluntarily assume.
5 2
As Professor Mansfield explains, the law strives to protect plaintiffs
by ensuring that defendants, in posing risks to others, "act only in
accordance with [plaintiffs'] actual willingness." 153 The law limits
defendants' liability, however, by denying plaintiffs recovery
"whenever the results of [plaintiffs'] choice[s] turn[] out disadvanta-
geously. " 154 Thus, defendants are liable when they unreasonably
believe that plaintiffs were willing to encounter a risk but are
protected from liability when the plaintiffs are actually willing. 55
The assumption of risk defense has strong libertarian overtones.
It is "founded on a whole range of presuppositions thought to
underlie a free society," in the sense that it permits individuals to
is "sufficient to bar the action").
'48 See generally id. § 68, at 480-86 (discussing assumption of risk defense).
149 See id. § 68, at 481.
'-' Jane P. North, Comment, Employees'Assumption of Risk: Real orIllusoy Choice?,
52 TENN. L. REV. 35, 38 n.1 9 (1984) (quoting KENNETH SMITH & DENIS.J. KEENAN,
ENGLISH LAW 142 (2d ed. 1966)).
151 See Mansfield, supra note 9, at 26 (noting that if a defendant was unreasonable
in his belief as to a plaintiff's willingness to accept a risk, "then there is no reason why
he should not compensate the actually unwilling plaintiff").
152 See id. at 27-28 (recognizing the "fear of deterring defendants from responding
to the desires of willing plaintiffs as ajustification for the assumption of risk defense,"
yet noting that this policy justification is not an "unyielding consideration").
... Id. at 26.
'. Id. at 25.
... See id. Mansfield explains:
If defendants were bound to compensate whenever the results of [a
plaintiffs] choice turned out disadvantageously, they might well cease to act
at all in response to the desires of willing plaintiffs. At least a plaintiff's
chance of inducing action would be significantly reduced. Thus, it is to the
interest ofwilling plaintiffs as a class that a defendant who has been induced
to act by a willing plaintiff be shielded from liability.
... Unless the defendant is protected when he acts on a reasonable
belief, he will tend to hold back from acting in precisely those situations in
which it is to the plaintiff's interest that he should act.
Id. at 25-26.
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engage in risky behavior as long as they bear the costs associated
with their actions. 5 ' The libertarian rationale, however, has limits
in the context of HIV transmission because the costs that accrue
from the risk of transmission affect not only the plaintiff, but also
other individuals 5 ' and society as a whole.15 Because individu-
als might evaluate the costs of their own potential harm, but not the
costs of societal harm, informed choice, without more, will not
"likely ... lead to a socially desirable result."'59  Nevertheless,
variants of the assumption of risk theory can play a vital role in the
battle against AIDS. These notions of making plaintiffs bear their
own costs in certain situations can be used to regulate participation
in risky conduct and to allocate losses in ways that further socially
beneficial goals160 such as reducing the spread of HIV.
1. Assumption of Risk as an Independent Defense
Before analyzing the potential of the assumption of risk defense
to reduce HIV-transmission rates, it is important to define which
variant of the doctrine is under analysis.' 6 ' Although the term
"5 Id. at 23. Mansfield notes, however, that some of these presuppositions "have
been called into question or altogether discarded." Id.
"'7 See United States v. Bygrave, 40 M.J. 839, 842 (N.M.C.M.R. 1994) ("When the
HIV is passed to a specific victim, the potential exists in our society that many more
victims will be infected.").
15 Procuring consent from individuals that will be affected in the future would not
eliminate the harmful effects of AIDS. The spread of the disease would still drain
society's medical, legal, and social systems. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note
3, at 42 (noting that "AIDS is a resource-intensive disease that not only strains the
individual's capacity to cope, but also challenges" society's ability to support these
individuals); see also Mansfield, supra note 9, at 42 (stating that "[s]ociety has an
interest in the well-being of its members" and that "[a]t least as far as concerns
physical harm, there does not exist a sphere of individual interest where choice is
sovereign no matter how great the injury and trivial the gain").
... Mansfield, supra note 9, at 41.
"5 8 See id. at 41 (noting that assumption of risk theories can be used to regulate
"the control of conduct and the distribution of losses in the pursuit of broadly
conceived social goals"); see also id. at 23 (asserting that because "[a]ll individual
action bears mediately or immediately on the welfare of the community and any
distinction between public and private interests is at best a matter of degree," it is
appropriate for the law to "define goals for individual and society and.., set forth
rules judged likely to lead to their achievement").
161 Although the formulation "assumption of risk" is linguistically appealing, see
John W. Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REV.
5, 5 (1961), it is "a doctrine more difficult to understand and apply than almost any
other in the law of torts." Mansfield, supra note 9, at 17; see also Wade, supra, at 14
("Assumption of risk often affords a quick and easy way of talking about the issue
without undertaking an analysis of the total problem.").
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"assumption of risk" is sometimes used to denote a lack of duty on
the part of the defendant 16 2 or a form of comparative or contribu-
tory negligence, 16s this Comment focuses on the aspect of assump-
tion of risk that gives the defense its own unique identity. There-
fore, "assumption of risk" will be used to denote an implied or
express waiver of one's right to sue.
164
16 When assumption of risk is equated with a lack of duty, it is said to be applied
in the primary sense. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 707-08 (Cal. 1992)
("'[Pirimary assumption of risk' [exists] where, by virtue of the nature of the activity
and the parties' relationship to the activity, the defendant owes no legal duty to
protect the plaintiff from the particular risk of harm.... ."). "Most courts recognize
that [primary assumption of risk] is not truly a defense, but rathei simply another way
of stating that the defendant owed no duty to protect the plaintiff from the risk."
Duran v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc., No. 88-C5239, 1989 WL 112319, at
*2 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1989). As one commentator notes:
[W]here the plaintiff's awareness is likely to lead to self-protective measures
and a consequent reduction of the risk, it seems appropriate to speak of a
defendant's having been negligent towards a plaintiff and yet having violated
no duty owing to him. He conducted himself in a way that would have
resulted in liability but for some reason arising out of the informed choice
of the plaintiff to encounter the risk.
Mansfield, supra note 9, at 21.
163 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 495 (noting that "[w]here the
plaintiff acts unreasonably in [assuming the risk], it is said that [assumption of risk]
is merely one form of contributory negligence"). The fact that courts do not always
clearly distinguish between variations of the assumption of risk defense has generated
much confusion. One commentator summarizes the reasons for courts' inability to
untangle the varying views of the defense as follows:
In many of the cases in which assumption of risk appears as a possible
ground for decision, a number of other grounds seeming to support the
same result are also present. The phrase assumption of risk itself embraces
not one but several separable concepts, but more often than not the
application of any one of these concepts tends to the same result. As a
consequence, there is often no particular incentive for a court to undertake
the laborious task of untangling the different notions involved and pursuing
each to its logical end.
Mansfield, supra note 9, at 17-18.
164 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 67, § 496B (noting that the
waiver of one's right to sue if damages are later realized constitutes express
assumption of risk); DavidJ. Bederman, Contributory Fault and State Responsibility, 30
VA.J. INT'L L. 335, 348 (1990) ("[T]he doctrine of assumption of risk has ... been
seen as a denial of a duty owed to a victim because of an express or implied waiver."
(footnote omitted)). In this respect, the defense resembles the consent defense to
intentional torts. See Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law
of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213, 224 (1987) (stating that
"[c]onsent... is the most viable concept underlying assumption of risk"); id. at 248
(stating that "[a]ssumption of risk is often casually described as the doctrine of
consent applied to nonintentional torts, and especially to negligence").
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2. The Elements of the Assumption of Risk Defense
To establish that the plaintiff effectively waived her right to sue,
the defendant must prove that:
1. The plaintiff had knowledge and appreciation of the risk,
2. The plaintiff's choice to incur the risk was free and voluntary,
and
3. The actual harm to the plaintiff was within the scope of the
risk assumed. 165
Each of these elements will be addressed in turn.
a. Plaintiff's Knowledge of the Risk
In order to succeed in his assertion of the assumption of risk
defense, the defendant must prove that the plaintiff was aware of,
and appreciated, the risk imposed upon her. The standard used to
measure the plaintiff's knowledge is usually a subjective one; it is
not enough that a reasonable person would have known of the
risk. 166
The actual application of the knowledge element, however,
often embraces a quasi-objective test." 7  Proponents of this
interpretation argue that all potential parties to AIDS suits "should
be expected to know, based on the information about AIDS, that a
substantial risk of contracting [HIV] exists upon engaging in
unprotected sexual intercourse with a stranger."16 By imputing
165 See KEETON, ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 486-87 (describing the elements of
the assumption of risk defense).
'" See id. § 68, at 487 (stating that "[t]he [knowledge] standard to be applied is,
in theory at least, a subjective one, geared to the particular plaintiff and his situation,
rather than that of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence who appears in
contributory negligence").
117 See, e.g., Tuley v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 843 P.2d 248,249 (Kan. 1992)
(noting that "[tihe plaintiff will be held to comprehend a risk that must have been
quite clear and obvious to him or her"); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d
530, 538 (N.D. 1977) ("Obviousness of the danger, objectively determined, may
suggest that a particular plaintiff subjectively assumed the risk of that danger .... ").
'6 HarrisJ. Zakarin, Scared to Death: A Cause ofActionfor AIDS Phobia, 10 TOURO
L. REV. 263, 291 (1993). Information on the risk of HIV transmission was
communicated in the Surgeon General's Report, disseminated nationally in 1986. See
Corliss, supra note 28, at 719 (noting the cautionary wording of the Surgeon
General's Report: "'Unless it is possible to know with absolute certainty that neither you
nor your sexual partner is carrying the virus of AIDS, you must use protective
behavior.'" (quoting SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 16)).
Note that if the act in question occurred before there was widespread knowledge
of the disease, the knowledge element of the assumption of risk defense would not
be satisfied unless the defendant could prove that the particular plaintiff was aware
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an element of public knowledge to a particular plaintiff, quasi-
objectivists imply that plaintiffs who deny such knowledge are "not
to be believed, so that in effect, something of an objective element
enters the case, and the standard applied in fact does not always
differ greatly from that of the reasonable person."169
As previously stated, to assume a risk, a plaintiff must not only
know of the risk, but must appreciate it as well. One aspect of
appreciating the risk is understanding its gravity. The law has yet
to resolve the level of risk appreciation required for the assumption
of risk defense. At one end of the spectrum, requiring the plaintiff
to know the precise level of risk involved would vitiate the assump-
tion of risk defense and would contradict all established definitions
of risk.17° Requiring simply that the plaintiff appreciate that some
risk exists, however, is equally infeasible. Any unprotected sexual
encounter theoretically carries with it some risk. Requiring only
minimal risk appreciation to invoke the assumption of risk defense
would improperly negate liability for truly negligent defendants
who, because of awareness of their possible HIV infection, pose
unreasonable risks to their partners when they engage in unpro-
tected sexual contact.
b. Voluntary Assumption of Risk by the Plaintiff
"'The Maxim, be it observed, is not "scienti non fit injuria," but
"volenti." It is plain that mere knowledge may not be a conclusive
defence [that the plaintiff assumed the risk].'"'7 To successfully
assert the assumption of risk defense, a defendant must prove (1)
of the risk. See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441,444 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (noting
that a legal duty to prevent the spread of HIV did not arise because the information
available in 1985 was not sufficient to warn the defendant that he was at risk of
spreading the disease). This is not problematic, however, because a defendant who
communicates HIV before knowledge of the disease was widespread will not likely be
found negligent. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
169 KEETON ET AL,., supra note 30, § 68, at 488; see also Burdt & Caldwell, supra
note 67, at 678 n.173 (stating that "[s]ince AIDS and its harmful effects have been
extensively publicized in the press, as well as on radio and television, the defendant
should not have a difficult time showing that the plaintiff appreciated the danger of
the condition").
17, See Mansfield, supra note 9, at 39 (noting that requiring knowledge of the exact
level of risk would demand "an exact prevision of the future that would displace any
notion of risk").
1 Wade, supra note 161, at 8 n.17 (quoting Bowen, L.J., in Thomas v. Quarter-
maine, 18 Q.B.D. 685, 696 (1887)).
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that plaintiff made an assumption, and (2) that the assumption was
voluntarily undertaken.
172
Plaintiff's assumption, if not explicit,17 will either be implied-
in-law' 74 or implied-in-fact.7 5  Implied-in-fact assumptions, the
prevailing assumptions in the AIDS context, are enforced when one
could reasonably infer from the plaintiffs behavior that the plaintiff
had agreed to run the risk. As Professor Keeton states: "[I]f the
plaintiff proceeds to enter voluntarily into a situation which exposes
[her] to the risk, notwithstanding any protests, [her] conduct will
normally indicate that [she] does not stand on [her] objection, and
has consented, however reluctantly, to accept the risk and look out
for [her]self."176 For example, an individual in an immunization
line who holds her arm out for the doctor assumes the risks
associated with immunization. 77  Similarly, in the context of
AIDS, if the defendant warns the plaintiff of his HIV status, and the
plaintiff proceeds to engage in sexual acts with the defendant,
courts will likely conclude that the plaintiff implicitly agreed "to be[]
subjected to a danger of possible invasion."
171
In addition to establishing that assumption of risk can be
implied from the plaintiff's conduct, a defendant must also prove
that the plaintiffs conduct was voluntary. In the HIV-transmission
context, the defendant would have to show that the plaintiff freely
'7 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 490 ("[T]he plaintiff is barred from
recovery only if [her] choice [to incur the risk] is a free and voluntary one.").
" The plaintiffmay expressly relinquish her right to sue. Contracting out of tort
liability in this manner will generally be enforced by the courts, barring a statute or
public policy to the contrary. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS §55, at 305-07 (2d ed. 1955); Wade, supra note 161, at 8.
174 To say that an assumption is implied-in-law is the equivalent of saying that
courts will find that the plaintiff assumed the risk regardless of the plaintiff's actual
willingness to waive her legal cause of action. See, e.g., Saxton v. Hawksworth, 26 L.T.
851,853 (Ex. Ch. 1872) (stating that "ifa servant enters into an employment knowing
there is danger and is satisfied to take the risk, it becomes part of the contract
between him and his employer, that the servant shall expose himself to such risks as
he knows are consistent with the employment").
" See Walter F. Zenner, Casenote, The Interrelationship Between Design Defects and
Warnings in Products Liability Law: Abbot v. American Cynamid Co., 11 CEO. MASON
U. L. REV. 171, 182 (1989) (noting that assumption of risk may represent an "implied-
in-fact agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant that the latter does not owe
the former a duty which would otherwise exist").
176 KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 490.
'7 See O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891) (noting that
where a ship passenger voluntarily submits to vaccination by the ship's physician she
cannot maintain an action against the ship owner for assault by the physician).
178 Wade, supra note 161, at 7.
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and voluntarily engaged in the sexual conduct that transmitted the
virus. Volitional acts procured through duress or coercion will not
suffice.179
c. The Harm Must Be Within the Scope of the Risk Assumed
Finally, in order to assert the assumption of risk defense
successfully, the defendant must show that the harm the plaintiff
suffered was within the scope of the risk that the plaintiff as-
sumed.'80 In the case of negligent transmission of HIV, this
element is usually easily satisfied."' 1 If a plaintiff agrees to engage
in sexual activity with a person she knows is infected, then she
cannot claim that her contraction of HIV was outside of the scope
of the risk assumed. In sum, strict application of the assumption of
risk doctrine would lead one to believe that an individual in today's
society who engages in unprotected consensual sexual conduct,
without any assurances that the person she is involved with is HIV-
negative, assumes the risk of the sexual transmission of HIV.
1" This has been a general rule of law since the landmark case of Marshall v.
Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974). In Marshall, the plaintiff was gored by a wild
boar as he ran to his car, which was parked in his driveway. The court held that the
assumption of risk defense did not apply because the defendant was forcing the
plaintiff to choose between two evils-remaining in his house or risking an episode
with the wild boar. See id. at 260. Similarly, in the context of HIV transmission, the
plaintiff does not assume the risk of HIV infection if the defendant makes her choose
between two evils, one of which is risky sexual contact with him. As stated by Keeton:
"Even where the plaintiff does not protest, the risk is not assumed where the conduct
of the defendant has left [her] no reasonable alternative. Where the defendant puts
[her] to a choice of evils, there is a species of duress, which destroys the idea of
freedom of election." KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 490-91.
"80 In the words of the Restatement:
[A] plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself or to his things
caused by the defendant's conduct or by the condition of the defendant's
land or chattels, and who nevertheless voluntarily chooses to enter or
remain, or to permit his things to enter or remain within the area of that
risk, under circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it, is not
entitled to recover for harm within that risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 67, § 496C.
181 See infra part III.A.3 (discussing the anomalies of the harm-within-the-risk
prong).
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III. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO THE APPLICATION OF
ASSUMPTION OF RISK: WHY IT IS NOT THE BEST
APPROACH TO SATISFY SOCIETY'S NEEDS
Although the assumption of risk doctrine can contribute to a
reduction in the spread of HIV, its current application is not the
most efficient means of accomplishing that goal.8 2 As one legal
scholar notes, implied assumption of risk-that aspect of assumption
of risk that dominates in the context of HIV transmission-causes
"the greatest misapprehension and confusion as to assumption of
risk, and [leads to] its most frequent misapplication."183 As
currently applied, assumption of risk leads to ambiguous and
inconsistent judicial decisions. 4 As the facts of a given case stray
from the most simplistic fact patterns, the predictability of judicial
decisions decreases. This is problematic for two reasons. First,
inconsistent decisions frustrate tort law's ability to effect deter-
" Cf. Simons, supra note 164, at 214 (noting that the "traditional doctrine [of
assumption of risk] deserves sharp revision, but not necessarily abolition").
'83 KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, at 484.
1 Justice Frankfurter explains the source of this confusion in Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), stating:
[T]he phrase "assumption of risk" is an excellent illustration of the extent
to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a
literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon
establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different
and sometimes contradictory ideas.
Id. at 68.
Under the current tort regime, assumption of risk creates additional confusion
when it is not clearly distinguished from contributory negligence. See Samuel R.
Guelli, Case Note, Tort Law: The Status of Assumption of Risk in Product Liability in
Ohio After Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg., 566 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio 1991), 18 U.
DAYrON L. REV. 243, 246 (1992) (noting that confusion abounds because voluntary
and unreasonable encountering of a known risk is often intermittently labeled as
contributory negligence or assumption of risk); see also Rosas v. Buddie's Food Store,
518 S.W.2d 534,539 (Tex. 1975) (recognizing that assumption of risk "has generated
so many elusive distinctions that precedent is often of little help"); Robert L. Spell,
Stemming the Tide of Expanding Liability: The Coexistence of Comparative Negligence and
Assumption of Risk, 8 MISs. C. L. REV. 159, 162 (1988) (stating that "[t]he confusion
[surrounding the application of assumption of risk] has been fueled, in part, by the
failure of the courts and commentators to recognize a consistent usage of assumption
of risk").
1995] ASSUMING THE RISK OF AIDS TRANSMISSION
rence.185 Second, such decisions often place the burden on the
less deterrable person.
186
The following sections discuss the reasons why courts are not
able to apply the assumption of risk defense consistently in its
current form. These reasons can be grouped into two general
categories. First, the interpretation of the elements of the defense
varies considerably. Second, a literal application of the present
form of assumption of risk would lead to undesirable results.
" Varying the defense on a case-by-case basis may lead to favorable results in
some instances. As one commentator notes, assumption of risk
is not clarified by being tied too closely with "consent," "voluntary,"
"knowledge," and "appreciation." Each of these terms is also a variable,
inconstant and unstable, meaningful only in the light of the factual and
environmental context of the particular case, and can only frustrate
judgment if given or attempted to be given a stable or static content of
meaning. It is not here suggested that this easy convertibility of doctrine
and the instability of its vocabulary are disadvantageous, or are to be
condemned. On the contrary, the inability to achieve a unifornity of
terminology and usage may well be the very factors in the judicial process that
insures the freedom of a court to reach a just or at least an acceptable result in the
particular case.
Leon Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense, 22 LA. L. REV. 77,78 (1961) (emphasis added).
The inconsistency in the application of the defense is problematic, however, when the
tort system is being used to affect social behavior. Mansfield advocates a clear legal
test for assumption of risk:
Results merely sensed to be right, even if they are right, lack that quality of
reasonableness necessary for acceptable law-making. They contribute
nothing to the upbuilding of a structure of general thought within which the
solution of genuinely difficult problems can succeed .... When such [legal]
concepts are not developed, the courts necessarily continue on a purely ad
hoc basis, with the injustices that this mode of decision can breed.
Mansfield, supra note 9, at 18. Individuals will not be apprised of the acts that are
condoned and admonished by society and, as a result, they will not modify their
behavior accordingly. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the effect
that clear and consistent rules have on individual action).
" There are two ways in which inconsistent court decisions will result in instances
in which the burden is placed on the party who is less deterred. First, instead of
reinforcing broadly accepted societal norms, some courts will expand the elements
of the defense to reach decisions that appearjust. Second, other courts, attempting
a literal translation of the assumption of risk doctrine, may hold a plaintiff liable
based on her knowledge that HIV exists and that no one is immune. See supra note
168 and accompanying text (discussing the quasi-subjective interpretation of the
assumption of risk knowledge element). Such conclusions may run counter to the
fact that the defendant'was in the best position to avoid the HIV transmission.
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A. Varied Interpretations of the Assumption of
Risk Elements
1. Ambiguity in the Definition of Knowledge
Although courts generally agree that the knowledge requirement
for the assumption of risk defense is more subjective than the
reasonable person standard, they do not agree on the level of
subjectivity required. At one end of the spectrum, commentators
advocate a purely subjective test. Donald Hermann articulates this
view, warning that courts cannot properly assume or require that
"common knowledge be included in any given person's knowl-
edge."187 Thus, in the context of HIV transmission, subjectivists
maintain that the defendant cannot successfully assert that the
plaintiff assumed the risk unless the defendant fully disclosed his
HIV status and the nature of the virus."88 Under this view, the
prevalence of information on AIDS should play no role in determin-
ing whether a person knew of the risk of HIV infection associated
with sexual behavior.
In practice the knowledge standard is often applied less
strictly.189 The plaintiffs assumption of the risk is judged accord-
187 Hermann, supra note 75, at 42 (noting that a "question arises whether a person
who consents to sexual relations implicitly assumes the risk of contractingAIDS, given
the widespread knowledge of the nature of the disease and the means of transmis-
sion," but concluding that only subjective knowledge should constitute assumption
of the risk).
" See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 45, at 155 ("[T]he defendant must be able to show
that [he] made full and accurate disclosure of [his] disease and its contagiousness in
order to demonstrate that a plaintiff consented... or assumed the risk of infection
under a negligence theory.").
189 In fact, the 1993 decision of Doe v. Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678 (J. Ct. 1993),
illustrates a court's willingness to consider employing a fully objective test. In Doe,
the defendant transferred chlamydia to the plaintiff, her former boyfriend. See id. at
679. The court discusses the assumption of risk defense in dicta, stating that:
A person assumes the risk where he voluntarily subjects himself to a peril
known to him or generally observable by a person of ordinary prudence in
his situation .... In the same vein, persons who engage in unprotected sex,
at a time of the prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases, including some
that are fatal, assume the risk of contracting such diseases. Both parties in
an intimate relationship have a duty to adequately protect themselves.
When one ventures out in the rain without an umbrella, should they
complain when they get wet?
Id. at 681. One could reasonably infer from the court's language that it would apply
the assumption of risk doctrine to the sexual transmission of HIV regardless of a
plaintiff's actual knowledge or awareness of the risk. On this basis, the assumption
of risk defense could potentially eviscerate the cause of action for the negligent
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ing to "whether a reasonable person in defendant's shoes would
believe that plaintiff had (subjectively) consented, not whether a
reasonable person in plaintiff's shoes would have consented."19
There are also "some things ... which are so far a matter of
common knowledge in the community, that in the absence of some
satisfactory explanation a denial of such knowledge simply is not to
be believed."19'
Accordingly, the law must define a principled threshold of risk
appreciation which shifts legal responsibility back onto the plaintiff.
Infinite variations of the indicia of risk which might become known
to the plaintiff make this line drawing difficult. For example, a
defendant may inform a plaintiff that he falls in one high-risk
group, when he actually falls in two." 2 The latter may work to
double the plaintiff's chance of contracting HIV. The question then
arises as to whether the plaintiff appreciated the risks involved in
having sexual relations with the defendant.'93 The current as-
sumption of risk defense leaves these difficult issues of measuring
knowledge and appreciation of risk unresolved.
2. Differences in the Definition of Voluntary
The interpretation of "voluntary" encompasses two layers of
confusion. First, although many courts define voluntariness as a
lack of coercion, some find that there must be "actual willingness to
accept the risk."'94 Second, courts cannot agree on a definition
for coercion.
This second level of confusion creates a distinct set of intricate
problems. For example, some legal theorists call for an abolition of
the distinction between coercion caused by the defendant and
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.
"9 Simons, supra note 164, at 252; see also Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions,
155 A.2d 90, 94 (N.J. 1959) (noting that actual knowledge of a risk is not required;
assumption of risk can be "applied to a risk which a reasonable [person] would have
detected").
191 KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 488.
"9 A plaintiff would assess the risk as being considerably higher if, for instance,
defendant had engaged in both unprotected sex with multiple partners and
intravenous drug use, as opposed to only one of the two.
19 Although this question highlights an open issue in tort law, the query is by no
means novel. See Russo v. The Range, Inc., 395 N.E.2d 10, 13-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(differentiating between types of harms based on the ways in which they are realized,
stating that "it is possible to infer that Russo's ride down the slide was an abnormal
occurrence caused by some danger unknown to him and a risk he did not assume").
" Wade, supra note 161, at 8.
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coercion caused by other forces. 95 This problem becomes partic-
ularly acute in the context of AIDS because duress may be effected
by a number of mechanisms outside the defendant's control. 9
For example, the plaintiff may become intoxicated before her
encounter with the defendant.'9 7 In such cases society may want
to hold the defendant liable for his actions because "the risks are
high and the plaintiff so much at the mercy of the defendant, that
the law deems it best to forbid the defendant to act in a dangerous
manner, even though the plaintiff is willing that he should." 9 '
195 See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 40 (1987) (noting that one commentator
maintains that when someone consciously takes advantage ofanother's adversity, 'the
fact that he did not create [the situation] should be treated as of little importance'"
(citation omitted)). Samuel Williston addresses this theory in the context of contract
law, stating that "if such circumstances were known[,J and advantage taken of them
by the other party, a degree of pressure which would not ordinarily amount to duress
may be deemed to have such a coercive effect as to invalidate a transaction." 13
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1608, at 682-83 (3d
ed. 1970).
The threshold level of duress that must be met to invalidate an assumption of
risk is lower than that required to vitiate a victim's consent in the criminal act of rape.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (stating that a person
is guilty of rape if he procures sexual intercourse by physical force, by threatening
anyone with imminent death, serious bodily injury or pain, or kidnapping, or by
substantially impairing a person's ability to control their actions through the use of
drugs, intoxicants, or the like).
196 More than one commentator have gone as far as to suggest that a female may
be "coerced" by a male's implicit threat to deny her status: "Status can be a motive
for dating and for engaging in unwanted sex in dating relationships. In a recent pilot
study, for example, several women described having sex with a man to keep him in
the relationship because of the status he conveyed." Charlene L. Muehlenhard &
Jennifer L. Schrag, Nonviolent Sexual Coercion, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN
CRIME 115, 119 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991). The courts will not
likely recognize this form of coercion, however, unless the woman "has a baseline
entitlement to [the man's] companionship." Donald A. Dripps, More on Distinguishing
Sex, Sexual Expropriation, and Sexual Assault: A Reply to Professor West, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1460, 1466 (1993).
197 This scenario is commonly played out on college campuses. See GOULD, supra
note 4, at 52 (noting that "80 percent of sexual relations among college students
involve alcohol"). The use of alcohol in sexual relations not only affects an
individual's ability to make an informed decision, but it also "weakens the immune
system and thus makes the [alcohol] abuser more susceptible to HIV infection."
PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4, at 83.
19' Mansfield, supra note 9, at 50. There may be instances where the plaintiff was
not coerced, but there was still a lack of conscious choice. Should "actual choice and
the opportunity for choice have the same legal consequences?" Id. at 37. There may
be cases when a participant does not decide that the sexual experience is worth the
risks, but merely acts as a passive participant who goes through the sexual experience
without having made a conscious choice. Cf. id. at 36 (differentiating between
circumstances in which a soldier weighs the alternatives of moving into enemy
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A second difficulty courts have found in defining coercion is
that a plaintiff may be susceptible to coercion by nature.' 99
"Natural" coercion is especially problematic in areas of tort law
involving sexual acts because of the physiological effect sex has on
the body: "Sex can be defined fairly adequately in physiological
terms as consisting of the building up of bodily tensions and their
release.""' Once bodily tensions reach a threshold level, the
plaintiff may be less able to exercise free will.2"1 Although most
courts will not adopt an approach that would allow parties to claim
coercion by nature,0 2 the flexibility in the current doctrine would
legitimize such an interpretation.
3. Confusion Surrounding Harm Within the Risk
In the context of sexual relations, courts may experience
difficulties in determining the exact scope of risk assumed by the
plaintiff. In general, the types of risk one assumes by engaging in
sexual intercourse include the transmission of venereal diseases, the
territory, and when he allows himself to get carried to the line with the charge of
soldiers). This type of situation presents a nuance of the assumption of risk doctrine
that will not be explored in this Comment.
199 In the sexual realm, "we're all puppets, and our best hope for even partial
liberation is to try to decipher the logic of the puppeteer." ROBERT WRIGHT, THE
MORAL ANIMAL 37 (1994);see also STEPHEN FROSH, SEXUAL DIFFERENCE: MASCULINITY
AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 104 (1994) (stating that "[s]ex is always there, an obsession, but
it is not part of us; being repudiated and repressed, it paradoxically threatens to take
control").
200 MAY, supra note 1, at 73.
20 See RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 199 (1987) (defining
akrasia (weakness of the will) as "doing something intentionally that one has
overriding reasons not to do" (emphasis omitted)). This may be particularly true if
the plaintiff is a male. See FROSH, supra note 199, at 99 (describing "'the overwhelm-
ing drive of male sexuality'" (quoting ARTHUR BIrITAN, MASCULINITY AND POWER 47
(1989))); WRIGHT, supra note 199, at 30 (stating that "'there can be no doubt that
sexual feeling in the female is in the majority of cases in abeyance.., and even if
roused ... is very moderate compared with that of the male'" (quoting STEVEN
MARCUS, THE OTHER VICTORIANS: A STUDY OF SEXUALITY AND PORNOGRAPHY IN
MID-NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 31 (1974))).
202 As one commentator notes:
The moral message is clear. To be human is to rise above the chain of
natural causality and to strive towards a meaningful autonomy. It is to
choose one's own values and then to attend to the implications of
coherently holding to them. For only if they are coherently followed do
values function as components of the personality. And only as a personality,
that is a thing with dignity, integrity and autonomy, is one human.
STUART TODDINGTON, RATIONALITY, SOCIAL ACTION AND MORAL JUDGMENT 42
(1993).
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spread of HIV, and pregnancy. The plaintiff, however, may not
assume the risk of each of these effects in every act of sexual
intercourse. For example, if a woman is informed that her male
partner is sterile, she does not assume the risk of pregnancy.
20
3
Similarly, if a plaintiff is assured by the defendant that he is HIV-
negative, the scope of the risk assumed would not include the
transmission of HIV.
Although this analysis appears simplistic, there may be gray
areas involved in determining whether the harm is within the scope
of the risk assumed. The following hypothetical describes an
improbable fact scenario that illustrates this confusion: A plaintiff,
assuming the risk of the sexual transmission of HIV, may engage in
sexual intercourse with a defendant. To excite his partner, the
defendant may unilaterally decide to poke the plaintiff's back with
a needle. It is then possible that the plaintiff would contract HIV
from the needle rather than from the intercourse. Although
plaintiff assumed the risk of HIV transmission, she assumed this risk
through sexual intercourse, not through the needle puncture. The
harm, HIV transmission through a needle puncture, was not within
the scope of the risk assumed. Note, however, that if one defines
the harm as "HIV transmission" instead of "HIV transmission
through a sexual episode," then the harm was within the risk
assumed. This presents an anomaly which, although recognized, is
not adequately addressed by the courts. The harm-within-the-risk
analysis varies with the court's definition of risk, 204 thus contri-
20 The plaintiff also may not assume the risk of HIV transmission if her partner
has acellular semen. See United States v. Perez, 33 M.J. 1050, 1053 (A.C.M.R. 1991)
(quoting the defense expert's testimony that the fact that the defendant had "a
vasectomy and the fact that he ha[d] not transmitted the virus either to his wife or to
other sexual partners ... [indicates that defendant] can't transmit the virus because
he has an acellular semen specimen" (emphasis omitted)); id. at 1052 ("'[T]he
... likelihood of [HIV] infection being spread by genital secretions is related to the
number of cellular elements in that fluid'" (quoting Dr. Tramont of Walter Reed
Army Medical Center, defense counsel's expert witness)). But see id. (noting that the
expert witness was never asked the "pertinent" question, that is "what effect a
vasectomy has on the ability of a HIV-positive male to transmit the AIDS virus in
vaginal sexual intercourse").
m As one court states:
It is apparent that when the risk is defined more narrowly.... the analysis
of voluntariness changes.... Appellant was familiar with varsity football and
he voluntarily participated in it, but it does not follow that he voluntarily
participated injungle football if such participation was required to make the
varsity team.... Another way to put this is that the voluntariness of
appellant's act must be proximately related to the danger (or the risk) which
caused the injury. Otherwise, the question of voluntariness, which is said
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buting to the confusion surrounding the current assumption of risk
doctrine.
B. Literal Interpretation of the Current Assumption of Risk
Doctrine Leads to Undesirable Results
Another reason why the current assumption of risk doctrine
encourages inconsistent decisions is that courts, realizing that a
literal interpretation of the doctrine will lead to unjust results,
manipulate the doctrine to achieve equitable outcomes.
20 5
Calahan v. Wood illustrates this reformulation. 216 In Calahan, the
plaintiff sought a ride home from her co-worker. When the co-
worker's car did not start, a few people pushed the car out onto a
public highway. The plaintiff remained in the car after the
participants realized that they would not be able to start the vehicle.
Soon thereafter, the car was struck in the rear by the defendant who
claimed that he could not see the car because of fog.
20 7
Applying the assumption of risk doctrine literally, one would
conclude that the plaintiff assumed the risk as to both plaintiffs and
defendant's conduct: plaintiff admitted that she knew "that it was
dangerous stopping a vehicle on a highway at night;" 2 ' her
conduct was voluntary; and, the harms associated with rear-end
to be at "the basis" of assumption of risk... would be avoided, for the only
relevant voluntariness is voluntariness related to the risk.
Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1208 (Pa. 1981)
(citation omitted). David DeWolf and Deborah Hander have analyzed this and similar
cases, concluding that:
When the risk is defined broadly ("those who play football are likely to get
hurt"), the average high school player voluntarily assumes [the risk]. On the
other hand, when the risk is defined narrowly ("those who play football for
a coach with less than the recommended twelve hours of training in injury
prevention") then the average player will almost never be aware of the risk
and, thus, will not be. said to have assumed it.
David K. DeWolf & Deborah G. Hander, Assumption of Risk andAbnormally Dangerous
Activities: A Proposal, 51 MONT. L. REV. 161,181 (1990); see also id. (noting that courts
operating within the bounds of the current assumption of risk test "cannot
meaningfully distinguish between those cases in which the plaintiffshould recover all
and those cases in which she should recover nothing").
205 One court recapitulated this view, stating that "'[t]he expression assumption
of risk is a very confusing one. In application it conceals many policy issues, and it
is constantly used to beg the real question.'" Russo v. The Range, Inc., 395 N.E.2d
10, 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (quoting Barrett v. Fritz, 248 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ill. 1969)).
o 465 P.2d 169 (Utah 1970), overruled on other grounds by Randle v. Allen, 862
P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993).
207 See id. at 170.
208 Id.
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collisions were clearly within the scope of the risk assumed.
Although this result follows from doctrinal application, the court
stated:
Generally, a guest by accepting a ride in an automobile does not
assume the risk of injury caused by the negligence of users of the
highway other than his host, unless the acts of the host in which
the guest acquiesces operate as a contributory cause of the
collision.
20 9
The court implicitly recognized the tension between the law
generally espoused by courts and the doctrine of assumption of risk.
Leading commentators also recognize that the current form of
assumption of risk does not readily lead to the results that courts
desire. Professor Keeton notes:
A pedestrian who walks across the street in the middle of the
block, through a stream of traffic traveling at excessive speed,
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be found to consent that
the drivers shall not use care to watch for him and avoid running
him down.
210
This is true even though the conventional elements of assumption
of risk are satisfied.2 11 As in other contexts, a literal interpreta-
tion of the assumption of risk doctrine in AIDS cases will not lead
to socially desirable results. Such interpretation will not always
place the burden on the more deterrable party, and thus will not
further the effort to decrease the spread of HIV.
IV. COMPARATIVE KNOWLEDGE: A PROPOSAL FOR THE
APPLICATION OF THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DEFENSE
TO THE SEXUAL TRANSMISSION OF HIV
Any new formulation of the assumption of risk doctrine should:
(1) maximize the reduction in the spread of HIV and (2) be clearly
stated so as to allow for consistent application. An assumption of
risk defense based on a comparative knowledge standard, contrast-
ing the defendant's and the plaintiff's relative knowledge of the
defendant's HIV status, rather than relying on the plaintiff's
absolute knowledge alone, satisfies both of these requirements.
This section proposes a comparative knowledge formulation for
assumption of risk and explores the rationale for making liability
2
09 Id. at 171.
210 KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 485.
211 See id.
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dependent on relative degrees of knowledge. The discussion then
demonstrates how both policy considerations and other areas of the
law support the consideration of comparative knowledge. Finally,
this section addresses potential arguments against adopting a
comparative knowledge standard.
A. Comparative Knowledge-A Theoy
Judges applying the comparative knowledge test proposed in this
Comment should apply the voluntary prong,212 the assumption
prong,213 and the harm-within-the-risk prong214 of the assump-
tion of risk defense liberally. The voluntary element should be
considered satisfied if the plaintiff was not forced to engage in the
sexual act. The plaintiffs assumption should be satisfied by the
mere fact that the plaintiff engaged in risky behavior. HIV
transferred by semen or vaginal fluids should be considered within
the scope of the risk assumed by one who voluntarily comes into
sexual contact with another's genitals. By interpreting these three
elements liberally and consistently,21 5 courts will establish bright
lines separating cases in which the plaintiff has assumed the risk
from those in which she has not. Furthermore, a liberal interpreta-
tion will include more plaintiffs within the assumption of risk
framework, allowing the assumption of risk doctrine to turn on the
knowledge element-the element most closely linked to deterrence.
With respect to the knowledge prong, courts should not inquire,
as they currently do, into whether the plaintiff had knowledge of the
defendant's HIV status. Instead, courts should employ a compara-
tive knowledge approach that would consider the difference
between the plaintiff's and the defendant's levels of knowledge.
Assumption of risk should be a viable defense only when the
plaintiffs knowledge of the defendant's HIV status is equal to or
greater than the defendant's knowledge. The following discussion
will demonstrate why the costs of HIV transmission should be
allocated to the party with greater knowledge.
212 See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text (discussing the voluntary nature
prong of the assumption of risk defense).21
1 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the assumption prong of
the assumption of risk test).
214 See supra part II.C.2.c (discussing the harm-within-the-risk prong of the
assumption of risk test).
215 See supra part II.A.3 (discussing the benefit of consistent rules).
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If the law is to effectively deter individuals from engaging in
HIV-transmitting behavior, it must take into account the factors that
motivate individuals to partake in or abstain from such behavior as
well as the net effect of liability allocations.216  Several predomi-
nant motivational factors include fear of death,1 7 conformance
with morality,218  and susceptibility to stigmatization. 219  The
216 The proposal advanced in this section assumes that individuals are rational
actors. Intuitively, sexuality seems to be driven by impulsive, somewhat irrational
forces. Even when driven by impulse, however, human beings can be considered
rational as long as they can weigh considerations and form reasoned, albeit poor,
judgments. See K.D. Irani, Introduction: Modes of Rationality, in RATIONALITY IN
THOUGHT AND ACTION at xi, xi (Martin Tamny & K.D. Irani eds., 1986) ("Rationality
is ordinarily taken to be that characteristic of human beings which makes their
thinking consistent and reliable, that aspect in particular which deals with inferences,
judgments, and decisions."); Raphael Stern, Modalities, Rationality, and Intervention, in
RATIONALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, supra, at 261, 262 (stating that "if someone
is behaving rationally, then, at least, he or she will, or can, consider alternatives").
Rationality is an important premise in both the formulation and the application
of legal rules. See, e.g., YVES R. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
109 (1951) (noting that the law's persuasive power is "to awaken ... voluntary
inclination toward a certain course of action"); Samuel D. Cook, Coercion and Social
Change, in COERCION 107, 112 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1972)
(stating that individuals "at times, have to be compelled to limit their wills, actions,
and desires and to recognize the rights and claims of others").
The fact that individuals choose to use condoms in sexual activity is some proof
of their rational thought processes:
[T]he use of condoms by adolescents has been found to be correlated with
factors related to rational choice, such as confidence in being able to use a
condom correctly (positive correlation), perceived cost of using a condom
(negative), and perceived risk of contracting AIDS if a condom is not used
(positive) ....
PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4, at 69 (citation omitted). It will be assumed for
the purposes of this Comment that individuals have enough free will to be able to
choose whether or not to succumb to the power of nature.
217 One commentator describes the manner in which individuals deal with death:
[T]he fear of death ... is notorious for the efforts philosophers have
exerted to prove it irrational. The fear of death underscores some of the
problems surrounding the rationality of emotions, for it does not appear to
vary in relation to the certainty of death, which is constant. It depends on
other factors, including its envisaged closeness in time. And what could that
have to do with rationality?
DE SOUSA, supra note 201, at 5.
218 See, e.g., PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4, at 98 (arguing that altruists will not
generally engage in unprotected sex after testing positive for HIV, whereas egoists
will not likely engage in safe sex once they learn that they have been infected); id. at
107 (stating that persons who are in high-risk groups have been moving toward safer
sex).219 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 27,393-99 (discussing the
stigmatization surrounding the AIDS pandemic).
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more these factors affect an individual's decision-making process,
the less likely the individual will be to engage in high-risk sexual
behavior. Thus, increasing levels of these motivational factors will
correlate with increasing levels of deterrence. This relationship can
be approximated by the following formula:
D = FD+ M+ SS2
where
DT = Ability to be Deterred,
FD = Fear of Death,
221
M = Sense of Morality, and
S, = Susceptibility to Stigmatization.
To best curb the spread of HIV, the law should allocate liability
according to each parties' relative susceptibility to deterrence.222
Because the impact of these factors increases with the knowledge of
the potential for HIV infection,221 the ability to be deterred also
increases with knowledge.224 Therefore, liability should be placed
220 It is not suggested that these three factors are the only determinants of parties'
susceptibility to deterrence. In fact, factors such as sexual drive, emotional needs,
and machismo can also affect an individual's ability to be deterred. See GOULD, supra
note 4, at 53-59 (describing various cultural barriers to guarding against HIV
transmission); id. at 78 (noting that "[flor many young men [in Tanzania] the acronym
AIDS stands for 'Acha Iniue Dogedego Siachi,' meaning in Swahili 'Let it kill me
because I will never abandon the young ladies'"); PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4,
at 218 (noting that safe sex causes a "loss of sexual enjoyment" for some individuals).
22" If a person is sufficiently close to death, he will likely be experiencing
numerous symptoms that might lessen his sex drive. Thus, greater proximity to death
would act as a factor deterring him from sexual activity. Similarly, as a person's
proximity to death decreases, and if he is asymptomatic, health no longer becomes
a prevailing factor in his decisions to have sex. He may, however, believe that he is
"going to his maker" and thus must not perform certain acts that would lessen his
opportunity for the pristine afterlife. Cf GOULD, supra note 4, at 54 (noting that one
survey indicates that over 50% of those individuals who die before they reach the age
of 55 believe "in some sort of life after death"). Alternatively, he may repress any
notions of death.
This assertion assumes that, for those individuals who have not already been
deterred by other factors, the closer they are to being deterred, the more likely that
the increased deterrence gained by civil liability will cause them to avoid risky sexual
behavior.
The more aware an individual is that HIV might be transmitted in a
contemplated sexual encounter, the more heavily these motivational factors will weigh
on that person's thought process. A person who has no reason to suspect a risk of
HIV transmission has little reason to consider death, morality, or stigma in deciding
whether to engage in the sexual conduct. In contrast, a person concerned about the
possibility of HIV transmission will weigh these factors in deciding whether to run the
risks associated with the contemplated sexual conduct.
"4 For example, a plaintiff who suspects that a defendant is HIV-infected will be
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on the individual with greater knowledge of the risk of HIV
transmission. 225 Table I provides an illustration of the manner in
which the motivational factors vary with knowledge.226
TABLE I
MOTIVATIONAL ANALYSIS
KNOWLEDGE ABILITY TO BE
LEVEL MOTIVATION FACTORS DETERRED [DT]
Fear of Death: X X+Y+Z
IGNORANCE Morality: Y
Stigmatization: Z
Fear of Death: X+X (X+X,)+
SUSPICION Morality: Y+Y (Y+Y)+
Stigmatization: Z+Z1  (Z+Z1)
Fear of Death: X+X+X 2  (X+Xl+X2)+
IMPUTED Morality: Y+Y+Y 2  (Y+Y1+Y2)+
AWARENESS Stigmatization: Z+Z+Z 2  (Z+Z,+Z2)
Fear of Death: X+X+X 2+X (X+X1+X2+X)+
AWARENESS Morality: Y+Y,+Y 2+Y3  (Y+Y1 +Y2+Y3)+
Stigmatization: Z+Z+Z 2+Z3  (Z+Z,+Z2+Z3)
As seen in Table I, the deterrence associated with the motiva-
tional factors increases incrementally with knowledge. In almost all
situations, a defendant will possess the same degree or a greater
degree of knowledge than the plaintiff. 27 In those situations
motivated by the fear of death to a greater degree than if she is ignorant of the
defendant's condition. Conversely, a defendant who is aware of his positive HIV
status will be more influenced by a sense of morality to avoid transmitting the virus
than if he merely suspects that he is infected.
2 A more detailed analysis of the comparative knowledge theory is presented
infra part IV.B.1. The purpose of the present discussion is to introduce the
relationship between knowledge and the ability to be deterred.
22 See supra text following note 81 (defining knowledge categories). Note that the
subscripted variables indicate the differences in motivation between adjacent
knowledge levels.
"' Generally, HIV status is learned from test results or is inferred from conduct.
Therefore, it is unlikely that a plaintiff will have greater knowledge as to the
defendant's condition than the defendant. In fact, unless a defendant discloses his
risk factors and/or HIV status to the plaintiff, his knowledge will generally be greater
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where the defendant has a greater degree of knowledge of his HIV
status, he is more easily deterred. The following example illustrates
this fact: Assume plaintiff is ignorant of defendant's condition (DT
= X + Y + Z) and defendant suspects he is HIV-positive (DT = (X + X)
+ (Y + Y1) + (Z + Zj )). The defendant's ability to be deterred will
exceed plaintiffs by:
Relative DT = ((X + X) + (Y + Y) + (Z + Z)) - (X + Y + Z), or
Relative DT = X1 + YJ + ZJ.
Therefore, when the defendant's knowledge exceeds the plaintiff's,
liability should be placed on the defendant. In the situation when
the plaintiff s and the defendant's knowledge levels are equivalent,
however, their relative susceptibilities to deterrence will be zero,
indicating that further analysis is necessary to isolate the more
deterrable party.22
Table II summarizes the possible knowledge combinations and
resulting liability allocations.229 The table also illustrates the fact
that the defendant will not be liable if he does not suspect, or have
reason to suspect, that he might be HIV-positive.30
TABLE II
LIABILITY ALLOCATIONS FOR RESPECTIVE
LEVELS OF KNOWLEDGE
PLAINTIFF'S KNOWLEDGE
DEFENDANT'S Imputed
KNOWLEDGE Ignorance Suspicion Awareness Awareness
No cause No cause No cause No cause
Ignorance of action of action of action of action
Suspicion Defendant Plaintiff Plaintiff Plaintiff
Imputed
Awareness Defendant Defendant Plaintiff Plaintiff
Awareness Defendant Defendant Defendant Plaintiff
than the plaintiff's.
a See infra part IV.B.l.d for further analysis of the equivalent-knowledge scenario.
"2 Table II presupposes the conclusion reached infra part IV.B.I.d: Assumption
of risk should be a viable defense when knowledge levels are equivalent.
2" See supra part II.B.l.a (noting that if the defendant has no reason to know of
his positive HIV status, he does not breach a duty to the plaintiff by engaging in
sexual activity with her).
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B. Benefits of a Comparative Knowledge Standard
1. Comparative Knowledge Effects Maximum
Levels of Deterrence
One result of the application of the comparative knowledge
prong is that it will reduce the sexual transmission of HIV by
maximizing the deterrence for all individuals engaging in risky
behavior, not just for those infected with HIV.23 1 In fact, the
allocations presented in Table II will help reduce the spread of HIV
for two reasons. First, the liability rules will provide the defendant
with an additional incentive to disclose his HIV status, because if he
discloses this information he may protect himself from civil liability.
Disclosure is beneficial to society because it promotes informed
decision-making. Because the defendant already has the requisite
knowledge to avoid transmission, disclosure to the plaintiff will
encourage additional scrutiny in her decision-making process. It is
hoped that informed decisions regarding risky sexual behavior will
lead to protective measures that will reduce the spread of HIV. At
a minimum, it will ensure that both parties have the information
necessary to evaluate the consequences of their actions, thus
increasing the chance that at least one of the parties will either
insist on the use of a condom or will avoid the sexual encounter
altogether.
Second, the allocations place the burden on the plaintiff when
she has knowledge equivalent to or greater than the defendant
because, in general, plaintiffs will be more deterred than similarly
informed defendants. Knowledge of a potential partner's HIV
status will have a more profound impact on a plaintiff's decision
than the threat of tort liability will have on a defendant's decision,
because the plaintiff faces the possibility of death, whereas the
threat to the defendant is only monetary. 2 2  Because it is to
" Unlike victims of torts in which the plaintiff is not causally related to the harm,
potential HIV-infected plaintiffs may choose to modify their behavior to prevent the
spread of HIV. First, plaintiffs can abstain from intimate sexual contact. Second,
they can inquire into their partner's HIV status before engaging in high-risk activity.
Third, plaintiffs can use condoms and spermicide to help reduce the chance of
transmission. Fourth, and least effective, they can ensure that their sexual partners
are not members of high-risk groups such as intravenous drug users, males who have
engaged in homosexual activity, or people who have had many sexual partners. By
modifying behavior through one or more of these strategies, potential plaintiffs can
effectively contribute to a decline in the transmission of HIV.
" The plaintiff's ability to be deterred may also be greater because she can
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society's advantage to promote a defendant's disclosure of his HIV
status, a plaintiff should pay her own costs when she has equal or
greater knowledge of the defendant's condition.
The following examination applies the preceding analysis to
several knowledge scenarios. This examination will verify that the
liability allocations presented in Table II will help reduce the spread
of HIV by deterring individuals from engaging in risky sexual
behavior. For clarity, plaintiffs and defendants will be grouped into
the following categories based on their respective knowledge levels.
In the first two categories the parties' knowledge is asymmetrical:
Plaintiff Ignorant; Defendant Suspicious or Aware (PI/DSA):
The plaintiff is unaware of the defendant's HIV status, and the
defendant has reason to believe, or knows, that he is infected with
HIV.
Plaintiff Suspicious; Defendant Aware (PS/DA):
The plaintiff has reason to believe that the defendant is infected
with HIV, but defendant is certain that he is seropositive.
In the last two categories the parties have symmetrical knowledge:
Symmetrical Ignorance (SI):
Both parties are unaware of their own and their partner's HIV
status and have no reason to believe that either is infected with
HIV.
Symmetrical Suspicion/Awareness (SSA):"
Each party has reason to believe or knows that the defendant is
infected with HIV.
Each of these scenarios will be addressed in turn.
a. Plaintiff Ignorant, Defendant Suspicious or Aware
In the PI/DSA hypothetical, the plaintiff's and the defendant's
knowledge levels are asymmetrical. The plaintiff is ignorant of the
defendant's HIV status, whereas the defendant has reason to
believe, or knows, that he is HIV-positive. In either scenario, the
defendant, whose knowledge -is greater, is more likely to be
motivated by liability allocations than the plaintiff. Although his
final decision may be influenced by thoughts of death and pangs of
desire, the defendant will be better situated to consider the effects
of liability than will a plaintiff who lacks his insight and may not
weigh these competing concerns.
choose to have sex with uninfected persons.
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Shifting plaintiff's costs to the defendant in the PI/DSA scenario
will also further the effort to decrease the spread of HIV, because
it will encourage defendants to disclose their suspicions or actual
knowledge about their HIV status to plaintiffs. In sum, in order to
promote the deterrence of acts that lead to the spread of HIV,
courts should find that plaintiffs in scenarios resembling the PI/
DSA case do not assume the risk of transmission.
b. Plaintiff Suspicious, Defendant Aware
In the PS/DA category, the plaintiff has reason to believe that
the defendant is HIV-positive, but the defendant is certain that he
carries the virus. This category has some of the same characteristics
of the PI/DSA category. As with the previous scenario, the issue
turns on which party will be more deterred by civil liability. Again,
the defendant's knowledge gives him greater insight. Although this
is a closer case, putting the liability on the defendant will help to
decrease the spread of HIV, because it will encourage defendants to
ensure that plaintiffs are fully informed of their sexual partners'
HIV status.
c. Symmetrical Ignorance
In this instance, the defendant has no knowledge that he poses
a risk to the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant's actions cannot be
considered negligent, because he has not breached a duty to act as
a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the circum-
stances. When the defendant is ignorant of any risk of HIV
transmission, a prima facie case of negligence is not established,
and, consequently, the assumption of risk defense is irrelevant.
23 3
d. Symmetrical Suspicion/Awareness
The SSA scenario involves parties with equivalent levels of
knowledge as to the defendant's HIV status. Either both parties
have reason to believe that the defendant is infected with HIV, or
both parties know that the defendant is infected. In both cases, the
defendant will probably be considered prima facie negligent for the
transmission of HIV. Moreover, motivational factors which
correlate with knowledge234 are no longer useful to identify which
233 See supra text following note 89 (noting that a defendant who is justifiably
unaware of his HIV status will not be considered negligent).
2" See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text (identifying the primary
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party is more easily deterred. Thus, other considerations must be
explored to determine which party should bear the liability.
When the parties' relative levels of knowledge as to the
defendant's HIV status are equivalent, the plaintiff should bear her
own costs for several reasons. First, such a liability rule rewards the
defendant for disclosing his HIV status." 5 Second, if the burden
were to remain on the defendant in the equivalent-knowledge
scenario, then the defendant would always bear the monetary
burden of disease transmission, 2 6 and there would be no addi-
tional incentive for plaintiffs to avoid risky sexual behavior. Thus,
allowing the assumption of risk defense in the equivalent-knowledge
case will ensure that both parties have some increased deterrence
from engaging in risky sexual acts. Lastly, the plaintiff should bear
the burden when all else is equal because, as previously acknowl-
edged, plaintiffs should be more easily deterred than defendants
with equivalent knowledge.
2
3
7
In sum, the analysis of the parties as grouped into the four
categories described above supports the position that the compara-
motivational factors as fear of death, conformance with morality, and susceptibility
to stigmatization).
235 If the defendant discloses his HIV status he can escape prospective civil
liability. See infra part IV.B.1 (analyzing the benefits of disclosure).
' This is assuming that the plaintiff will never have greater knowledge as to the
defendant's HIV status than does the defendant.
237 See infra part IV.B.1 (analyzing plaintiffs' and defendants' relative susceptibili-
ties to deterrence).
Some may argue that disparate treatment of plaintiffs and defendants can be
rationalized by examining the ordinary factors that lead individuals to engage in sex.
Physiology dictates that these drives will vary along gender lines. Men and women
differ "most importantly in the libido department." WRIGHT, supra note 199, at 30.
Whereas men, as a group, are eager and nondiscriminating, women are arguably
passive and selective in their sexual encounters. See id. at 40 (stating that "natural
selection encourages 'an undiscriminating eagerness in... males and a discriminating
passivity in ... females"); id. at 43 ("In one experiment, three fourths of the men
approached by an unknown woman on a college campus agreed to have sex with her,
whereas none of the women approached by an unknown man were willing."). The
dichotomy that may exist between men and women may affect each group's ability to
be deterred from sexual acts. Because plaintiffs of heterosexual orientation are more
likely to be women, and defendants are more likely to be men, one could argue that
it should also affect liability allocations. See HOMBS, supra note 38, at 10 (stating that
"women are the fastest growing category of cases" of HIV infection); Brett-Smith &
Friedland, supra note 3, at 20 ("Women account for... 61 percent of all cases [of
HIV transmission] attributed to heterosexual contact."). Thus, even though this
argument is not advanced in this Comment, it lends support to the conclusion that
the viability of assumption of risk in the SSA scenario will lead to a reduction in the
spread of HIV.
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five knowledge standard will aid in deterring behavior that may
result in the spread of HIV. When the plaintiffs knowledge is
equivalent to that of the defendant (SSA), assumption of risk should
be a viable defense because it will encourage other potential
defendants to disclose their HIV status, thus aiding in the effort to
deter plaintiffs from engaging in risky sexual behavior. When the
plaintiff's knowledge of the defendant's HIV status is less than that
of the defendant's (PI/DSA and PS/DA), assumption of risk should
not apply for two reasons: first, because the defendant will give
more weight to the consequences of civil liability, and second,
because such a rule will encourage the defendant to disclose his
HIV status.
2. A Clear and Consistent Rule: Comparative Knowledge as a
General Solution to the Misinterpretation and
Misunderstanding of the Assumption
of Risk Doctrine
As previously stated, there are two main reasons why the courts
do not consistently apply the assumption of risk defense: (1) too
many of its terms are open for interpretation, and (2) its literal
application leads to unjust results.28 The use of a comparative
knowledge standard solves both of these problems by providing a
bright-line test. Such a test would result in consistent rulings in the
HIV-transmission context and in other substantive legal areas. Two
examples help to prove this point.
First, consider the situation in Calahan v. Wood.239 In that
case, even though the traditional elements of assumption of risk
were satisfied, the court did not allow the defendant to escape
liability. The outcome of the case contributes to the inconsistency
surrounding the assumption of risk doctrine, while furthering
legitimate societal goals. The same result, however, could have been
reached if the court had simply compared the plaintiffs and the
defendant's knowledge. At the point preceding the accident, the
defendant's knowledge about the impending disaster was greater
than that of the passenger plaintiff.2 9 This disparity in knowledge
238 See supra part III.B.
9 465 P.2d 169 (Utah 1970), overruled on other grounds by Randle v. Allen, 862
P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993). See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. This
hypothetical "has baffled a great many law students, some judges, and unhappily a few
very learned legal writers." KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 485.2 The defendant was inevitably better informed as to whether he would be able
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would justify a denial of the defendant's assumption of risk defense
because he was the party with greater knowledge.
241
The preceding scenario illustrates that courts will not, under a
comparative knowledge formulation of assumption of risk, be forced
to apply incorrectly the assumption of risk defense to reach just
results. Another advantage of comparative knowledge is that it
decreases the need for extensive interpretation of the assumption
of risk prongs by the courts. The standard of knowledge, the
voluntary nature of the action, and the harms within the risk can all
be interpreted very liberally by the court. Consequently, the courts
will need to make fewer judgments as to whether each of these
prongs is satisfied. Application of the defense will, instead, turn on
a comparison of the parties' knowledge.
The benefits of this approach are also illustrated in the following
hypothetical: An automobile accident occurs on New Year's Eve
involving a drunk driver and a sober driver in which the drunk
driver was driving negligently. Although a person driving on New
Year's Eve voluntarily assumes a known risk that there will be drunk
drivers on the road, courts refuse to relieve the drunk driver of
liability. To reach this decision, a court must stretch the harm-
within-the-risk prong of the traditional assumption of risk defense.
Under a comparative knowledge analysis, this confusing inquiry
would be unnecessary. A court would interpret the harm-within-the-
risk prong very liberally so that all such harms are within the risk
assumed. Then a court would look to the knowledge of the parties
to determine whether the defense should be applied. In this case,
although the plaintiff knew that there was a chance that drunk
drivers would be on the road, the defendant knew for a certainty
that he was drunk.2 42 A comparative knowledge analysis would
to swerve and miss the car, and he was undoubtedly in a better position to judge his
prospective response time.
241 Some cases have come close to comparing defendant's and plaintiff's
knowledge in the context of assumption of risk. See, e.g., Higgins v. Mason, 174 N.E.
77, 79-80 (N.Y. 1930) (finding that a passenger assumed the risk of a dangerous
automotive condition of which the driver was unaware); see also McConville v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Wis. 1962) (suggesting that a passenger
may assume a certain risk by riding with a driver whose lack of skill or known habits
present a hazard).
242 In contrast, if the plaintiff knows that the defendant was driving drunk around
a racetrack and, despite this fact, decides to take her car out onto the track, the
plaintiffvoluntarily assumes the known risk with the equivalent level of knowledge as
the defendant. Thus, as intuition would dictate, the plaintiff assumes the risk and is
barred from recovery.
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place liability on the defendant-the same result that is reached by
contorting the present formulation of the assumption of risk
doctrine but without the confusion.
C. Law and Policy Support the Adoption of Comparative Knowledge
Adoption of a comparative knowledge standard not only
furthers societal goals by providing a means for reducing the spread
of HIV, it is also supported by long-established principles of law and
policy. This section first illustrates how basic theories of contract
law support a comparative knowledge standard. Then, it discusses
policy considerations, such as the last clear chance doctrine, that
further bolster the application of the comparative knowledge
standard.
1. Comparative Knowledge and Contract Law Principles
a. Unconscionability
Under basic unconscionability theory, courts are reluctant to
uphold contracts in which one party takes advantage of his superior
knowledge to the detriment of the other party.243 In such a case,
the court will declare the contract unconscionable, finding "an
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties [and]
contract terms which [are] unreasonably favorable to the other
party."244  Because unconscionability has had such widespread
This point has been made by Keeton: "[O]ne who utilizes the services of a
defendant engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity will be regarded as assuming
the risk that is universally known to exist." KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 79, at
566; see also id. (stating that "a passenger in an airline will assume the risk that is
normally associated with air travel even though the use of airplanes may be regarded
as abnormally dangerous," and noting that an employee who "agrees to work with
dangerous animals... assumes the risk, and cannot recover when they injure him").
In such cases, the defendant's and plaintiff's levels of knowledge are equivalent.
24S See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (West 1987) (stating that an
unconscionable action is one in which an individual "takes advantage of the lack of
knowledge" of another); Langemeier v. National Oats Co., 775 F.2d 975, 977-78 (8th
Cir. 1985) (holding a contract unconscionable because the defendant had failed to
provide the plaintiff with certain information); Bernard G. Helldorfer, Contracts and
Commercial Litigation, 42 Bus. LAW. 614, 615 (1987) (stating that "it has long been
recognized that sometimes one party may lack sufficient information.., to bargain
on equal terms, and courts in such instances may strike down or rewrite an agreement
on the ground that it is unconscionable").
24 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,449 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 314 (1982) (noting that courts still
focus on the Williams court's definition ofunconscionability); see also Shell Oil Co. v.
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application in the area of contract law,245 there is reason to
conclude that it should also be advanced in the area of tort law.
246
By holding that a plaintiff has assumed the risk of an accident,
even when the plaintiff has not entered into an explicit exculpatory
contract, the courts are essentially holding the plaintiff to an
implied or fictional contract.2 47 If such a contract is based upon
widely disparate knowledge, unconscionability principles should
apply.2 48 It seems unconscionable that a defendant would be able
to escape liability for transferring HIV to the plaintiff when the
agreement to participate in sexual activity was unreasonably
Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 602 (NJ. 1973) (finding unconscionability in a contract in
which "the provisions ... [were] the result of [the franchisor's] disproportionate
bargaining position and [were] grossly unfair"), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974).
243 The concept of unconscionability is so well ingrained in contract law that
courts will void existing contracts when there is a large disparity in the parties'
bargaining positions. In fact, the UCC addresses "unconscionable" contracts and
clauses, stating:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the applica-
tion of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1994). Although Article 2 of the UCC only applies to contracts
for the sale of goods, courts can apply the UCC concept to other types of contracts
by analogy or apply the analogous unconscionability provision in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1992).
246 SeeJoseph P. Tomain, Contract Compensation in Nonmarket Transactions, 46 U.
PITT. L. REV. 867, 891 (1985) (noting that "[t]he distinction between torts and
contracts ... is artificial"); id. at 888-89 (noting that because the rules and policy
arguments in torts and contricts overlap, "[a] class of cases exists which, like ghosts,
wanders the nether world between torts and contracts");see also Martha C. Nussbaum,
Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714, 732
(1994) (stating that similar ideas, "whether under the influence of economists, under
that of the more radical thinkers, or even under the influence of the closely-related
positions of Holmes," penetrate both torts and contract law).247 See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 19, at 27 (1952) (noting that
a contract implied in law, also referred to as a "quasi-contract," is a fictional contract
imposing an obligation "created by the law for reasons of justice, without any
expression of assent and sometimes even against a clear expression of dissent"); see
also Schott v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 259 A.2d 443, 449 (Pa. 1969) (imposing
liability even though it was against the intentions of the parties).
248 The concept of basing tort liability on the difference between the plaintiff's and
defendant's knowledge is not novel. The court in Yaniger v. Calvert Bldg. & Constr.
Co., 37 A.2d 263 (Md. 1944), held that with respect to injuries sustained by a plaintiff
entering the defendant's premises, "[tihe true ground of liability is the proprietor's
superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality or the danger therefrom to
persons going upon the property. It is when the perilous instrumentality is known
to the owner or occupant, and not known to the person injured, that a recovery is
permitted." Id. at 264.
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favorable to defendant. The defendant could have easily ensured
that the plaintiff had this knowledge without unduly burdening
himself.
Application of the comparative knowledge standard to the
assumption of risk defense circumvents this unconscionability
problem and ensures fairness in the defense's application. Plaintiffs
will not be held to implied, exculpatory contracts when defendants'
superior knowledge precludes plaintiffs from making truly informed
decisions. In addition, comparative knowledge promotes the policy
considerations underlying the unconscionability doctrine-it creates
an incentive for defendants to engage in fair bargaining with plain-
tiffs.
b. Misrepresentation
Contracts between plaintiffs and defendants with differing levels
of knowledge may also be voidable based on concepts of misrepre-
sentation or concealment. As one commentator states:
The requirement of "assent," which is fundamental to the
formation of a binding contract, implies in a general way that both
parties to an exchange shall have a reasonably clear conception of
what they are getting and what they are giving up. If the identity
or the character of the property or service being bought or sold is
overtly misrepresented by one of the contracting parties, then the
other party's assent is obviously less than meaningful and any
agreement that results will be regarded as voidable3
49
Although some courts distinguish between cases in which the
defendant makes an assertion and those in which he merely fails to
reveal a particular fact,250 most courts hold that the latter consti-
tutes misrepresentation when the discrepancy relates to a "basic
assumption" and the failure to disclose "amounts to a failure to act
in good faith."
2 5 1
249 
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAw OF
CONTRACTS 66 (1990); see also Mansfield, supra note 9, at 25-28 (comparing contract
law and assumption of the risk).
2" See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 249, at 67 (raising the question of whether
nondisclosure of a material fact should be treated as the legal equivalent of
misrepresentation).
2-1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 245, § 161(b). The "basic
assumption" and "failure to act in good faith" requirements are intended to promote
informed decision-making by a commercial buyer. Their primary application is to
remove from the list of unconscionable contracts those "cases involving so-called
market information which is typically the product of research and special expertise
1995] ASSUMING THE RISK OF AIDS TRANSMISSION
To further the policy goals supporting the misrepresentation
defense, the assumption of risk defense should not be applied when
the defendant has more knowledge than the plaintiff and the
difference in knowledge goes to a basic assumption made by the
plaintiff when deciding to engage in a particular activity. A
comparative knowledge analysis curtails the use of the assumption
of risk defense in this manner. In the context of HIV transmission,
a defendant would not be able to invoke the defense if the plaintiff
were unaware of a basic assumption (that is, that the defendant was
HIV-positive) when the plaintiff decided to engage in sex with the
defendant.
2. Comparative Knowledge and Policy Considerations:
The Last Clear Chance Doctrine
Consideration of the difference between the plaintiffs and
defendant's knowledge in an assumption of risk analysis is support-
ed by the policies underlying the last clear chance doctrine.
252
Once the defendant proves the plaintiffs contributory negligence,
the plaintiff can regain her claim by establishing that the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.253  One premise
behind the last clear chance doctrine is that it is economically
efficient to reduce the total number of accidents.5 4 Society,
on the part of the potential buyer." CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 249, at 68.
" The last clear chance doctrine, which originated in England in 1842, see Kevin
J. Grehan, Note, Comparative Negligence, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1668, 1678 & n.57 (1981)
(citing Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. D. 1842)), is a rebuttal against the
contributory negligence defense to negligent torts. See KEETON ET. AL., supra note 30,
§ 65, at 451 (discussing the contributory negligence defense to negligence actions).
2s See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 66 (noting that the claim of a plaintiff will
be upheld, in a jurisdiction that applies a contributory negligence scheme, if the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the harm); Robert N. Strassfeld, Causal
Comparisons, 60 FomI-iAm L. REV. 913, 930 (1992) (stating that "[t]he 'last clear
chance' rule ... negates the bar to recovery that would result from the plaintiff's
contributory negligence if the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
harm").
' Another premise behind the last clear chance doctrine is that the individual
who has the last opportunity to avoid the accident is more at fault. See Strassfeld,
supra note 253, at 914 n.8 (noting that "'[d]egrees of fault and proximity of causation
are inextricably mixed'" (citation omitted)). The rationale is that "if the plaintiff's
negligence is complete when the injury occurs ... the defendant's actions then
become the sole proximate cause of the injury." DeWolf& Hander, supra note 204,
at 163 n.14. Thisjustification for the doctrine includes a notion of temporal order
that has made last clear chance a "doctrinal muddle." Id. at 164; see also Strassfeld,
supra note 253, at 930 (noting that the last clear chance doctrine "reflects an intuition
about causal importance"). The temporal order aspect of last clear chance is largely
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therefore, does not want defendants to escape liability if they were
better situated to avoid the accident.255 Unfortunately, no coun-
terpart to the contributory negligence/last clear chance combina-
tion currently exists for the assumption of risk defense.
The inconsistency between the last clear chance and assumption
of risk doctrines can be remedied if courts incorporate the
difference between the defendant's and plaintiff's knowledge into
the assumption of risk formula. For example, the plaintiff may
know that the defendant is in a high-risk category for the transmis-
sion of HIV. If the defendant has this same knowledge, then the
knowledge is symmetrical and the plaintiff will bear the cost of the
HIV transmission. 25 If, however, the defendant knows that he is
HIV-positive, but the plaintiff is only aware that the defendant is in
a high-risk group, the defendant should not be able to invoke the
assumption of risk defense because he was in the better position to
avoid transmission. Such findings will allow courts to achieve
socially desirable results-liability will be placed on the person better
able to avoid the accident;257 therefore, the incidence of HIV
transmission should decrease.
D. Comparative Knowledge: Necessary and Feasible
1. Why Present Tort Theories Are Not Sufficient
to Deter the Spread of HIV
The assumption of risk doctrine has come under attack in recent
years:
The argument is that assumption of risk serves no purpose which
is not fully taken care of by the other doctrines [lack of duty and
contributory/comparative negligence]; that it adds only duplica-
irrelevant in the context of sexually transmitted diseases. It is not suggested,
however, that last clear chance be applied literally; rather, the policies behind the
doctrine can be promoted through application of comparative knowledge.
55 This doctrine, however, would give defendants no incentive to avoid a harm
that is partially caused by the plaintiff's negligence. See William Schofield, Davies v.
Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARV. L. REV. 263, 270-71 (1889)
(discussing last clear chance in terms of the public policy of creating incentives for
parties to exercise proper care).
' See supra Table II.
2 '5 The person with more knowledge is better able to determine whether the act
in question will result in harm.
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tion adding to confusion; and that it results in denial of recovery
in some cases where it should not be denied.258
This conclusion, however, is not accurate, especially in the context
of AIDS. In fact, accepting such an argument may lessen the
deterrent value of the negligence cause of action.
a. Assumption of Risk as a Lack of Duty
Some legal scholars argue that assumption of risk essentially
negates any duty that the defendant owes the plaintiff. They assert
that it would be simpler to say that because the plaintiff "consents,"
the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff in the first place.
Although both duty negation and assumption of risk act to relieve
the defendant of liability, there are key procedural differences
between the two theories.
2 59
Allowing assumption of risk to collapse into the duty element of
the prima facie case is "a disservice to the plaintiff, imposing upon
[her] a real procedural disadvantage, with no corresponding
gain." 211 The plaintiff would not only have to prove that the
defendant owed her a particular duty, she also would have to
demonstrate that she did not voluntarily consent to the defendant's
actions. Not only is this heightened burden unnecessarily harsh on
plaintiffs, but it is also particularly problematic in the context of
AIDS. By creating a presumption that the plaintiff has assumed the
risk of HIV transmission, the duty of a seropositive individual not
to transfer the virus to others is greatly minimized. The minimal
added deterrence that such a presumption ascribes to plaintiffs is
substantially outweighed by the diminished deterrence ascribed to
defendants. Thus, the no-duty permutation of assumption of risk
will not bring about a reduction in HIV transmission.
28 KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 493.
" The assumption of risk doctrine only applies if the plaintiff has met the burden
of proving that the defendant was negligent. Once the plaintiff has met that burden,
the burden of proof shifts to the defendant, who must demonstrate that the plaintiff
assumed the risk at issue. If assumption of risk is viewed as a lack of duty, however,
the plaintiff must prove the elements of the prima facie case and must demonstrate
that she did not consent to be exposed to the risk at issue.
2
1 KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 494.
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b. Assumption of Risk as a Form of Contributory/Comparative Negligence
Critics also assert that the benefits derived from the assumption
of risk defense are the same as those achievable through the
application of contributory and comparative negligence-that
assumption of risk is just another form of contributory or compara-
tive negligence.26 1 The two defenses, however, are different in
one very important respect:
[C]ontributory negligence involves inadvertence or unintentional
failure to measure up to a proper standard of self-protection,
while assumption of risk involves the conscious and deliberate
decision to encounter a known risk.... [I]t is suggested [that]
contributory negligence is measured by the objective standard of
the reasonable [person] while assumption of risk is controlled by
the subjective intent of the plaintiff [herself].262
One court elaborated on this distinction, stating:
[A]ssumption of risk involves the meeting of a subjectively known
risk, whereas contributory negligence may involve the plaintiff
exposing [herself] to a danger of which [she] was subjectively
unaware but which would have been apparent had [she] used due
care. With the former, plaintiffs conduct may be quite reasonable
because its advantages outweigh its risks; but regardless, if plaintiff
is injured, ... [she] is barred from recovering because of [her]
failure to exercise due care.
26 3
The differences between the assumption of risk defense and
contributory negligence are especially apparent when viewed in the
context of HIV transmission. To assert the assumption of risk
defense, the defendant must show that the plaintiff voluntarily
agreed to engage in sexual relations with the defendant and had
knowledge of the risks involved. With respect to contributory
261 The courts have often confused assumption of risk with contributory
negligence. One reason for this is that the two defenses both provide a bar to a
plaintiff's recovery. See id. § 68, at 481 ("Since either [assumption of risk or
contributory negligence] traditionally was sufficient to bar the action, it usually made
no practical difference what the defense was called, and it is not surprising that the
two have not been clearly distinguished, and are quite commonly confused.").
262 Wade, supra note 161, at 11-12; see also Mansfield, supra note 9, at 53 (stating
that contributory negligence "extends beyond the cases in which [a plaintiff]
appreciated the risk and includes those in which he merely ought to have appreciated
it").
26 Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002, 1006 (3d Cir. 1983); see also
KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 495 (stating that "assumption of risk is
governed by the subjective standard of the plaintiff himself, whereas contributory
negligence is measured by the objective standard of the reasonable man").
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negligence, however, the defendant has the burden of proving that
"the plaintiff had a duty to protect herself from diseases such as
AIDS,"2 that the plaintiff breached that duty,265 and that the
breach was causally related, both directly and proximately, to real
injuries sustained by the plainiff.266 The defenses only overlap
when "the plaintiff makes an unreasonable choice to incur [a]
risk."267 Thus, assumption of risk covers a myriad of fact patterns
that are untouched by the contributory and comparative negligence
defenses-those fact patterns in which a plaintiff may assume the
risk even though she acted as a reasonable person would have in the
circumstances.
The fact that assumption of risk overlaps contributory and
comparative negligence when a plaintiff's assumption is unreason-
able is not a sufficient reason for abolishing the assumption of risk
defense. By recognizing both the assumption of risk and contribu-
tory/comparative negligence defenses, 268 a plaintiffs deterrence
from engaging in risky behavior will be greater. The combined
effect of the two types of defenses will be to increase the scope of
factual scenarios in which a plaintiff will be unable to recover.
2. Avoidance of Liability: The Doctrine of Willful Blindness
The proposal advocated in this Comment focuses on subjective
knowledge.269  Consequently, individuals could potentially avoid
liability by "shut[ting] their eyes to what was plainly to be seen."
270
264 Zakarin, supra note 168, at 292.
26 The plaintiff's duty may be breached if she (1) does not "insist[] that the
defendant wear a condom," (2) does not refrain from engaging in sexual intercourse,
or (3) does not seek proof of the defendant's HIV status. Id.
26 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 65, at 453, 456-57 (discussing the elements
of the contributory negligence defense). The analysis required to prove the plaintiff's
assumption of risk is analogous to that required for the consent defense, whereas the
analysis surrounding the plaintiff's contributory negligence more closely resembles
the analysis used to prove the defendant's negligence. See id. § 18, at 112-13
(discussing the consent defense to intentional torts); see also supra note 68 (listing the
elements of the negligence cause of action).
267 KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 482; see also Koshorek v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 318 F.2d 364, 366-67 (3d Cir. 1963) (discussing ajury charge on comparative
negligence that failed to distinguish it from assumption of risk).
268 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 68, at 482 (noting that the assumption of
risk defense and comparative/contributory negligence can coexist).
269 Because subjective knowledge maybe proved through circumstantial evidence
or may be imputed through the use of the 'imputed awareness" knowledge category,
it is more accurately defined as a semi-subjective, semi-objective test.
270 United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964).
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An individual who thinks that he might be seropositive might avoid
testing for fear that a positive result would increase his potential for
civil liability.
It is possible to mitigate this knowledge dilemma through the
use of the "willful blindness" doctrine. 271 In essence, "a defend-
ant's knowledge of a fact may be inferred from willful blindness to
the existence of the fact."17 2 Courts may substitute constructive
knowledge for actual knowledge, finding that the defendant's
knowledge was greater than that of a plaintiff with equivalent actual
knowledge of the defendant's sexual history. In such cases, courts
may hold that the defendant was aware of his HIV status because he
had strong reason to know and could have found out through a
simple test. The same courts would likely find that a plaintiff, with
similar knowledge as to the defendant's HIV status, did not have the
defendant's awareness because she was not in a position to find out
with certainty and thus could not be held to be willfully blind.
Therefore, a defendant's attempt at evading knowledge would not
work to his benefit.
Even if courts make use of the willful blindness doctrine,
however, it is possible that there will still be some decrease in the
number of people who get tested..27  This decrease is minimized
271 The concept of willful blindness originated in English law. In the 1861 case of
Regina v. Sleep, ajudge ruled that the defendant could not be convicted of unlawfully
possessing naval stores unless he "knew that the stores were marked, or... wilfully
abstained from acquiring that knowledge." Regina v. Sleep, 169 Eng. Rep. 1296,1302
(Cr. Cas. Res. 1861) (Willes,J.).
One of the leading cases on willful blindness is United States v.Jewell, 532 F.2d
697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). InJewell, a stranger approached the
defendant, asking him whether he wanted to buy marijuana and/or drive the
stranger's car across the border for $100. The defendant declined to purchase the
drugs, but he agreed to drive the car. It was later found that there were drugs in a
secret compartment of the car. The defendant knew of the compartment's existence,
but he was not aware that it contained drugs. The court convicted the defendant for
knowingly possessing a controlled substance, stating that the defendant had "a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth." Id. at 700. The court concluded that
"[t]o act 'knowingly,' therefore, is not necessarily to act only with positive knowledge,
but also to act with an awareness of the high probability of the existence of the fact
in question." Id.
272 United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1129-30 n.22 (8th Cir. 1990); see also
United States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 584 (1st Cir. 1989) ("A
'willful blindness Ujury] instruction is appropriate when: (1) defendant claims a lack
of knowledge, (2) the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and
(3) the instruction, taken as a whole, cannot be misunderstood by a juror as
mandating such an inference.'" (quoting United States v. Hogan, 861 F.2d 312, 316-17
(1st Cir. 1988))).
272 This deterrence is potentially problematic because society derives a number of
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in two respects. First, individuals can get tested anonymously. 27 4
If an individual chooses to be tested in an anonymous capacity, no
medical record will exist for use in discovery.
2 7 5
Second, numerous compelling reasons for individuals to get
tested still exist. A person may want to get tested in order to assure
his partner that he is not infected with the virus.276 If the person
is an altruist, he may want to get tested to ensure that he avoids
infecting others.277 If the person is an egoist, he may want to find
out his status so that, if he tests positive, he can avoid engaging in
benefits from the testing process. One commentator has summarized some of these
benefits:
1. To identify seropositive individuals so that proper education and
counseling can be effected to prevent further transmission of the virus.
2. To identify seropositive individuals so that proper medical care can be
administered early in the course of the disease. Studies have shown
that HIV-infected patients may benefit from chemotherapy and from
chemoprophylaxis and immunizations against selective diseases before
the onset of clinical AIDS.
3. To identify, evaluate and counsel sexual partners and needle-sharing
partners of seropositive individuals.
4. To evaluate a patient with certain clinical signs and symptoms.
5. To enable a physician and patient to make certain therapeutic and
management decisions.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 21-22. Although there are many benefits to
be reaped from testing, the benefits are limited. See CURRAN ET AL., supra note 47,
at iv ("At this time, legally authorized screening programs would be unlikely to
achieve any clear public health benefit[, s]ince there is currently no treatment or
vaccine for prevention."). Although Curran's book was written prior to the discovery
of AZT, his hypothesis is still valid, as there is no cure for AIDS.
274 See AIDS INST., NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, HEALTH FORM No. 2566z,
INFORMED CONSENT TO PERFORM AN HIV RELATED TEST 1 (1991) [hereinafter
CONSENT FORM] (stating to potential test recipients: "If you do not want anyone to
know your test results or that you were tested, you can go to an anonymous test site.
You will not be asked your name or address.").
25 See PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 4, at 147 ("Unless records of test results
are kept and made available to tort plaintiffs or to prosecutors, which because of
concerns about privacy is unlikely, it would be difficult to prove that the carrier knew
he was such because he had been tested and the result disclosed to him.").
276 See id. at 86 (stating that a person may "decide to be tested in the hope that if
he tested negative [his partner] would consent to have risky sex with him"); id. at 85-
86 (recognizing that "a person who has either tested negative or knows himself to
have a very low probability of being infected may be unwilling to have risky sex with
another person unless the latter agrees to be tested and to reveal the result").
'77 See id. at 105 (noting that "altruists [may be] concerned with the risk of
infecting their sexual partners"); see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
34, at 279 (addressing altruism and noting that "[s]tudies of diverse groups of gay
men ... have shown that those who are seropositive take more precautions against
spreading the virus than those who are seronegative (who presumably are protecting
themselves)").
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safe sex.2 8 Apart from the sex-related reasons for testing, persons
may want to get tested for the following additional reasons:
A person may decide to be tested because it is a condition of
obtaining life insurance or medical insurance or a job that he
wants. Or because he wants to conduct his life with a realistic view
to its likely duration. Or because he suspects that he is infected
and believes that treatment with AZT, or other therapies, will be
more effective the sooner treatment is begun .... Or because he
wants to give (or sell) blood. A woman may want to be tested in
order to know whether she is likely to bear children who are
infected with HIV and doomed to die prematurely-or may want
to learn whether she is doomed so that she can have children
before it is too late.
279
In sum, the combination of (1) the use of the willful blindness
doctrine and (2) the remaining incentives which encourage testing
will help to obviate any decrease in testing which may result from
the implementation of a comparative knowledge analysis.
2s See PHILIPSON k POSNER, supra note 4, at 105 (stating that "egoists ... want to
know their infection status so that they can discontinue safe sex in the event that they
are already infected and therefore have less to lose from engaging in risky sex than
if they thought they were negative for the virus").279 Id. at 106 (footnotes omitted). The New York State Department of Health
informs potential testers of the following benefits to testing:
If you test negative:
[1] Your doctor or counselor will tell you how to protect yourself from
getting infected with the virus in the future.
[2] You can end the fear which may come from not knowing if you are
infected.
If you test positive:
[1] Your doctor can give you medical care and treatment that can help you
stay healthy and can slow down HIV illness.
[2] Your doctor can tell you how to prevent passing the virus to others.
[3] If you have had a child since you were infected, your child may need
additional care and treatment. Your doctor can provide information
about medical care available for children who may be infected with
HIV.
[4] If you are a pregnant woman, your doctor can provide the care you
need and information about services and options available to you.
Your doctor can tell you about the risks of passing HIV infection to
your baby and the medical care available for babies who may be
infected with HIV.
[5] If you are thinking of having a child, you will be told about the
possibility of passing the virus to your baby.
CONSENT FORM, supra note 274, at 1.
1995] ASSUMING THE RISK OF AIDS TRANSMISSION
CONCLUSION
The far-reaching psychological and social consequences of a
deadly infectious disease such as AIDS have not been experienced
since polio and smallpox plagued our society.280 "This good
fortune means that we lack recent social and political experience in
dealing with such problems." 21 As a result, HIV-transmission
rates continue to rise. Until the medical community can curtail this
rise by curing people or immunizing them from HIV, the legal
system must play an important role in minimizing the effects of
AIDS. Courts will be faced with many difficult decisions-decisions
that will not only affect the parties involved, but will also have
positive or negative societal consequences.
The proposal developed in this Comment-interpretation of the
assumption of risk doctrine in terms of comparative knowledge-is
intended to assist the court system in lessening the confusion
surrounding the current assumption of risk doctrine and rendering
verdicts that will create equitable rules to guide individual behavior.
In the context of AIDS, such rules will further society's goal of
decreasing the spread of HIV. By assigning liability allocations
based on parties' relative levels of knowledge, the comparative
knowledge test effects maximum levels of deterrence of engaging in
high-risk sexual behavior. It not only deters defendants by holding
them liable for transmitting the virus to nonconsenting plaintiffs,
but also deters plaintiffs when they have the requisite knowledge to
avoid the harm. The test creates bright-line rules to guide potential
parties' behaviors and encourages defendants to disclose their HIV
status, thus promoting informed decision-making. Employment of
the comparative knowledge standard should reduce the number of
sexual encounters that pose a risk of HIV transmission. Such a
result will lessen the drain on society's resources and, more
importantly, will reduce the number of individuals who will be
affected by the AIDS crisis.
2"0 See GOULD, supra note 4, at 1-2 (chronicling the spread of various diseases
throughout the world); Osborn, supra note 10, at 17-18 (commenting on the polio
epidemic of the mid-20th century).
28. Brandt, suPra note 129, at 42.
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